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Fully And Barely Clothed: Case Studies in 
Gender and Religious Employment 
Discrimination in the Wake of Citizens 




In 2010, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission.  The Court held that for-profit 
corporations could receive First Amendment protection for political 
speech.  Then, in 2014, the Court held in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby that 
closely held for-profit corporations could be considered persons under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  These cases have spurred much 
scholarship focusing on the treatment of corporations as people and 
citizens.  While supporters argue that these cases are consistent with 
corporate and First Amendment law, critics argue that the implications of 
these decisions could be perverse. 
This article contributes to the critical scholarship by arguing that 
these two cases might lead to unexplored perverse outcomes.  In particular, 
it argues that corporations may be designated as expressive associations 
under these newly minted First Amendment protections.  If they are 
expressive associations, then for-profit corporations could discriminate 
against certain employees who disagree with the corporations’ speech.  
The freedom of association jurisprudence allows expressive organizations 
to exclude people from membership if those people frustrate the 
organizations’ protected First Amendment activities.  Drawing upon this 
doctrine and using Hooters and Abercrombie & Fitch as case studies, I 
argue that designating for-profit companies as expressive associations 
could give these companies a right to exclude certain people from 
employment because such employees would frustrate corporate speech.  
 
* PhD Student, The Wharton School, The University of Pennsylvania, Legal Studies and Business 
Ethics Department. J.D. Harvard Law School, 2012.  B.A. Swarthmore College, 2009.  This paper won 
the Jackson Lewis Employment Law Best Paper Award at the Academy of Legal Studies in Business 
2015 Conference.  Thanks to David Zaring, Vincent Buccula, Amy Sepinwall, Eric Orts and Sarah 
Light for their helpful comments and insights.  A version of this paper was presented to Wharton 
Business School’s class Theories of the Business Enterprise, I am thankful to those participants in the 
class for their insightful comments.  All resulting errors are mine.           
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Can Hooters really only hire women to be waitresses? Can 
Abercrombie really not hire Muslim women because wearing a hijab is 
against their brand vision and “Look Policy”?  What about civil rights 
legislation and employment discrimination?  These are all seemingly 
unresolved questions. Companies can and do discriminate against 
employees, but only in very specific cases (instances that Hooters and 
Abercrombie do not qualify for).  But is there another argument (outside of 
employment discrimination) that might give these companies a right to 
discriminate against men and Muslims? 
I argue that in light of the Court’s recent jurisprudence on corporate 
rights, these corporations can effectively garnish this kind of absolute right 
to discriminate.  Corporations can now be considered expressive 
associations (associations that are allowed to limit membership in their 
groups based upon relevant expression).  This expressive association right 
effectively gives corporations a right to choose employees based upon 
certain speech rights. 
In 2010 the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission.1  The case held that for-profit 
corporations could receive First Amendment protection for political 
speech.2  Subsequently, legal scholars and philosophers have written 
extensively on the opinion of the Court and on the implications of the 
decision.3  The Court then, in 2014, handed down its decision in Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby,4 holding that closely held for-profit corporations could be 
considered “persons” under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and, as 
such, the owners could use the corporate entity to exercise their religion.5  
The Hobby Lobby opinion has also spurred a large domain of scholarship 
focusing on the treatment of corporations as people and as citizens.6 
 
 1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2. See generally id. 
 3. The domain of scholarship on Citizens United is extensive and the following list is not meant 
to be exhaustive by any means: Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011) (arguing that the Court has created incoherence in campaign finance 
jurisprudence with its ruling in Citizens United); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the 
Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s ruling in Citizens United 
departed from the Court’s previous theories of the firm); Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the 
Ineluctable Question of Corporate Citizenship, 44 CONN. L. REV. 575 (2012) (arguing that corporations 
are not normative citizens and hence do not need the same level of protected political speech as 
individuals). 
 4. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 5. See generally id. 
 6. We have not seen the full extent of scholarship on this case yet as the case came out recently.  
However, based upon the existing scholarship, conferences, and working papers discussing Hobby 
Lobby, it is clear that the case has spawned much controversy.  Some recent papers include: Alan J. 
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Legal scholars have articulated support and derision at both Citizens 
United and Hobby Lobby.  While supporters have argued that the cases are 
consistent with corporate and First Amendment law (in particular that 
companies can be established for whatever legal purpose its founders 
choose), critics have argued that the implications of the decisions could be 
perverse.7 
This article contributes to the critical line of scholarship by arguing 
that these two cases could have problematic implications.  But this article 
differs from previous scholarship by focusing on an implication that has not 
been explored.  It argues that these newly minted First Amendment 
protections could designate for-profit corporations as expressive 
associations giving them a protected right to exclude members from their 
organization.  If a corporation can promulgate substantive speech and 
exercise religion, then it stands to argue that the corporation can exclude 
people from being a part of the organization because those members 
disagree with its speech. 
Treating corporations as expressive associations provides a 
problematic new defense that corporations could employ in order to skirt 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“The Act”).  The Act outlaws 
employment decisions by companies (hiring, firing, promotion, and 
conditions or benefits of employment) based upon any one of several 
protected categories.8 
This defense would allow for-profit corporations to exclude certain 
employees from their companies even though they are in protected classes, 
because those employees frustrate the companies’ speech.  I draw upon two 
salient companies as examples: Hooters and Abercrombie & Fitch.  
Hooters is widely known as a restaurant that only hires women to be 
waitresses and requires them to wear revealing clothing intended to 
sexualize them.  Lately, Hooters has been criticized heavily for these 
practices.  Yet, since they continue to settle out of court, we do not have 
 
Meese and Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-
Profit Corporations are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273 (2014) (arguing that the holding in 
Hobby Lobby is consistent with the corporate theory of the firm); Frederick M. Gedicks and Andrew 
Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment 
Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51 (2014) (arguing that ruling in favor of Hobby Lobby would 
create a regime where significant costs of healthcare are going to be borne by female employees); Mark 
Tushnet, Do For-Profit Corporations Have Rights of Religious Conscience?, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
ONLINE 70 (2013) (arguing that there are several relevant and important factors in determining whether 
or not for-profit corporations have religious conscience). 
 7. Compare Michael W. McConnel, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 213 
YALE. L.J. 266 (2013) (supporting the Court in Citizens United), and Meese & Oman, supra note 6, 
(supporting the Court in Hobby Lobby), with Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Critique of Citizens 
United, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 765 (2014) (critiquing Citizens United), and Gedicks & Koppelman, 
supra note 6 (critiquing Hobby Lobby). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (e)(1) (2000). 
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insight into how a court would view their discrimination.  Abercrombie & 
Fitch has also frequently violated Title VII.  The Supreme Court actually 
heard a case in its 2015 session concerning Abercrombie’s discrimination 
against a Muslim woman.  I attempt in this article to show that recent 
jurisprudence could potentially give both Hooters and Abercrombie an 
expressive association defense against these Title VII violations. 
The defense would be rooted in a speech right of both Hooters and 
Abercrombie.  Hooters, by arguing that its purpose is to promote a 
misogynist view of women as servers, could be considered an expressive 
association.  It would then get protection for exclusionary decisions such 
that it could legally discriminate against employees (men, in particular) that 
frustrate its expression.  By forcing Hooters to hire men, its misogynist 
speech would be frustrated by Title VII requirements.  Abercrombie, via its 
“Look Policy,” could similarly argue that its policy is a type of expression 
(the ideal body type and style conducive for beauty) giving it the 
designation of an expressive association.  At which point, it would argue 
that it should be exempt from Title VII regulations that frustrate the intent 
of the “Look Policy.” 
The argument draws upon the doctrine and defense of the expressive 
association.  An expressive association defense arises out of the freedom of 
association jurisprudence.9  The right effectively allows an organization to 
“associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the 
First Amendment — speech, assembly, petition . . . and the exercise of 
religion.”10  Implicit in the expressive association designation is the right to 
exclude people from your organization if those people do not hold the same 
First Amendment views as you do (i.e. their presence is at odds with your 
speech).  The Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”) is an example of an expressive 
association.  They attempt to promulgate the speech of racial hatred.  And 
on these grounds, because that speech is protected as dissenting political 
speech, the expressive association defense allows the KKK to reject 
membership to minorities, as they would frustrate their racial hatred 
speech.11 
 
 9. The freedom of association is an integral part of the First Amendment.  The Court first 
recognized the right in Patterson, even though the text of the First Amendment does not explicitly grant 
the right.  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) 
 10. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).  It is important to note at the outset that the 
rights associated with the First Amendment manifest themselves in many ways (e.g., religion, privacy, 
political speech).  In this paper, however, I am only concerned with the right to exclude that the First 
Amendment entails.  A further discussion of how other rights associated with the First Amendment, 
generally, and the freedom of association, specifically, might apply to corporations is an interesting area 
needing further study, but it is beyond the scope of this article.  For a discussion of how privacy affects 
corporate rights in this context see Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 
27 (2014). 
 11. Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281, 
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Historically, however, expressive associations have been non-profit 
organizations and advocacy groups.  Generally, the Court and scholars 
have not viewed for-profit corporations as expressive associations under 
the freedom of association jurisprudence.12  Some scholars have argued that 
corporations could be seen as expressive associations, but most have 
concluded that corporations are different in some way and hence, should 
not be granted the right. 
This article proceeds in four parts.  Part II provides a background of 
the freedom of association jurisprudence, in particular a summary of the 
cases articulating the boundaries of an expressive association.  It attempts 
to show how the Court has effectively used a three-part test to adjudicate 
exclusionary rights. Part III summarizes the Court’s recent jurisprudence 
on corporate rights (Citizens United and Hobby Lobby) and uses this to 
show that the Court has opened the door for a for-profit corporation to be 
an expressive association (the first prong of the three-part test). Part IV 
summarizes the current employment discrimination jurisprudence and 
shows how a company could use an expression association defense to 
circumvent Title VII legislation (the mechanism for passing parts two and 
three of the test). Part V applies this paper’s argument to show how 
Hooters and Abercrombie could invoke a problematic corporate expressive 
association defense in order to justify their employment decisions.  Part VI 
concludes. 
This article attempts to show that treating corporations like expressive 
associations is dangerous and in light of recent cases is something, 
however, we might have to confront head on very soon.  At the end of the 
day, this article critiques the associative view of incorporation.  That 
owners and founders of corporations should not be allowed to express any 
speech they choose through corporate forms.13 
 
II.  THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
 
The freedom of association is an integral right that is part of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  The Court first recognized the right in NAACP 
v. Alabama even though the text of the First Amendment does not 
explicitly mention it.14  The right most basically holds that people may 
 
289 (D. Md. 1988). 
 12. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“There is only minimal constitutional 
protection of the freedom of commercial association.” (italics in original)). 
 13. See Tushnet, supra note 6, for a similar conclusion, i.e., that for-profits are unique in their 
profit making motive and hence should not be conduits for their founders to express individual speech 
rights. 
 14. See generally Patterson, 357 U.S. at 449.  The case here concerned the NAACP turning over 
their membership list to the Alabama state legislature in order to fully comply with the state’s 
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assemble in order to collectively express their individual right of free 
speech (“implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First 
Amendment is a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a 
wide variety of political, social, economic, education, religious, and 
cultural ends”15).  Over the course of the past fifty years, the Court has 
defined the scope of the doctrine and articulated two separate classes of 
protected associations — intimate associations and expressive associations.  
The doctrine and the distinctions of what qualifies as each are quite 
muddled.16  Nevertheless, providing a brief synopsis of each category will 
help to inform the mapping of the right onto corporations. 
 
A. INTIMATE ASSOCIATION 
 
Intimate association is reserved for personal “intimate human” 
relationships.”17  The typical example of intimate association is marriage. 
Integral to the freedom of speech is the freedom to marry and associate 
individually with whomever you prefer.  The government may not require 
you to personally associate with people of a certain gender, race, ethnicity 
or any other protected class.18 
Although seemingly trivial, this is an important right.  The 
government has the discretion, as I will discuss later, to require companies 
and clubs to some extent to not discriminate against a protected class, and 
instead to be inclusive with membership and employees.  However, the 
right for an intimate association is thought to be so pure and central to 







incorporation statute.  The Court held that the NAACP need not turn over the list because it violated 
their First Amendment right to associate in order to promulgate a certain speech (one of equality for 
African Americans).  In particular, the right of privacy was being violated. 
 15. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.  See also Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460; Neal Troum, Expressive 
Association and the Right to Exclude: Reading Between the Lines in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 35 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 641 (2002). 
16.  See Randall P. Bezanson et al., Mapping the Forms of Expressive Association, 40 PEPP. L. 
REV. 1, 27 (2013) (attempting to articulate what actually qualifies as an expressive or intimate 
association).  Included in this analysis, as examined in Part III, is a discussion of whether corporations 
after Citizens United will also qualify as expressive associations. 
 17. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. 
Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
 18. See generally Patterson, 357 U.S. at 449. 
 19. Id.  
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B. EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION 
 
More important for the rest of this article is the expressive association.  
The expressive association right is “a right to associate for the purpose of 
engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment — speech, 
assembly, petition . . . and the exercise of religion.”20  The Court has 
articulated two requirements in order to qualify to be an expressive 
association, an association prong and a speech prong.21  The association 
prong simply requires that there be some grouping or coming together of 
individuals to actually create an organization.  This prong is self-
explanatory and noncontroversial.  The second prong requires that the 
association participate in some speech activity, i.e., activity that is 
protected by the First Amendment.  This prong, however, has caused 
several problems in interpretation.22  What does it mean for an association 
to participate in speech?  Can the association have as its goal other means 
in addition to speech?  The problem occurs at the “definitional level of 
what an expressive association is and what qualities it must possess to 
qualify for constitutional protection.”23  This article’s discussion of how 
corporations might qualify as expressive associations goes to this exact 
uncertainty. 
But before discussion of how corporations might be seen as expressive 
associations, it is important to do a brief summary of the current state of the 
protections that the government offers to these so called expressive 
associations.24  At their most basic level, these protections exists to prohibit 
the government from interfering in the organization’s speech and activities 
via state or federal legislation.  This article only focuses on one means of 
protection that the Court grants to expressive associations: the right to 
exclude.  An expressive association has a right to exclude those individuals 
from being members of the organization if those members frustrate the 
organization’s speech.25 
 
 20. Roberts, 648 U.S. at 618. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See generally Bezanson et al., supra note 16. 
 23. Id.; see generally Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After 
Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515 (2001); Daniel A. Farber, Foreword, Speaking in 
the First Person Plural: Expressive Associations and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483 
(2001); Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. 
REV. 2353 (2000). 
 24. See Bezanson et al., supra note 16, at 29 (arguing that even the protections which are granted 
to expressive associations are sometimes hard to decipher). 
 25. Note that an expressive association might be given further protections that arise from other 
First Amendment jurisprudence (e.g., right of privacy of its members).  This article, however, only 
focuses on the right to exclude members of an organization because they frustrate an organization’s 
speech.  Although beyond the scope of this paper, an interesting expansion of my argument would be to 
articulate what other protections corporations might invoke as expressive associations. 
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The Court’s jurisprudence on the exclusionary right of the expression 
association is limited yet convoluted.  In determining whether an 
organization is justified in limiting its membership, the Court and scholars 
have at many times conflated the determination of whether an organization 
is an expressive association and whether its exclusion is justified.  A better 
way to think about the following cases is in a three-part test.  The first part 
should ask whether or not the organization is an expressive association in 
the first instance.  This, albeit difficult, determination goes to the purpose 
of the organization (i.e., what the founders of the organization had in 
mind).  Generally, if the purpose of the organization is speech activity, then 
the organization is categorized as an expressive association.  It is worth 
pointing out that the group need not have, as its only purpose, the 
dissemination of the speech at issue.26  Only that the group have some 
speech that it wishes to disseminate.  The second part of the test should ask 
whether or not the content of the organization’s speech is articulated clearly 
(i.e., what is the nature of the speech the organizations partakes in — 
religious, political, or social).  Finally, in the third part of the test, the Court 
should determine whether or not requiring the organization to open its 
doors to diverse members frustrates the speech articulated in the second 
part of the test. 
Some scholars, by not recognizing the distinction between frustration 
and expression have too quickly dismissed certain organizations from being 
treated as expressive associations.27  By looking at these cases with this 
three-part test in mind,  it can be argued that designating an organization as 
an expressive association is easier than some scholars initially thought and, 
as such, protecting the exclusionary actions of organizations (in particular 
corporations) quickly becomes problematic. 
In Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, the Court overturned the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, holding that the Jaycees could not prohibit women from 
entering into their organization.28  The Jaycees were a nonprofit 
organization that had as their objective “to pursue such educational and 
charitable purposes as will promote and foster the growth and development 
of young men . . . and [be] an avenue for intelligent participation by young 
 
 26. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 655 (“Associations do not have to associate for the ‘purpose’ of 
disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.  An 
association must merely engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to 
protection.”). 
 27. Many scholars think that the Court did not recognize an expressive association right to exclude 
in the Jaycees case.  They argue that it is evidence of the Court rejecting the Jaycees as an expressive 
association.  See, e.g., Bezanson et al., supra note 16, at 30–31. I, however, as discussed below, 
disagree.  Using the three-part test and a close reading of the opinion, it is clear that the Court did view 
the group as an expressive association, but did not think its speech was adequately frustrated by 
rejecting women. 
 28. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612. 
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men in the affairs of their community.”29  Historically, the Jaycees only 
allowed young men to be “regular members” but did allow women and 
older men to be “associate members.”  Associate members could not vote, 
hold local or national office, or participate in certain leadership training and 
award programs.  These activities were reserved for young men.30  Several 
women who were associate members brought suit against the Jaycees 
alleging a violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.31 
In holding that the prohibition against women in the group was a 
violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, we can infer a three-part 
test.  First, the Court determined if the Jaycees were in fact an expressive 
association.32  In holding that the Jaycees were indeed an expressive 
association the Court remarked that an organization must associate to 
pursue any of a “wide variety of political, social, economic, education, 
religious, and cultural ends.”33  The Jaycees are clearly an association that 
pursues a political or social end (one of young male success).  The second 
test was to determine what was the substance of the Jaycees’s speech.  The 
Court identified the group’s objective to “promote and foster the growth 
and development of young men’s civic organizations in the U.S. . . . to 
provide them with the opportunity for personal development . . . and to 
develop true friendship and understanding among young men” as 
“speech.”34  Finally, it asked whether the prohibition of women furthered 
the speech of the Jaycees.  Or, put differently, whether compelling the 
Jaycees to accept women would frustrate its speech. 
The Court found that the group’s speech was not necessarily furthered 
by excluding women.35  As Justice Brennan wrote for the Court, “‘[A] not 
insubstantial part’ of the Jaycees’s activities constitutes protected 
expression on political, economic, cultural, and social affairs.”36  The Court 
 
 29. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612. 
 30. Id. at 612–13. 
 31. Id. at 612 (explaining that the Act prohibited discrimination against women). 
 32. The Court did attempt to determine if the Jaycees qualified as an intimate association.  See 
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617–18.  Although an interesting argument, this is beyond the scope of this article, 
and in any case, it is quite clear that corporations would not be construed as instruments of intimate 
associations. 
 33. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.  Note, however, that Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion did 
not think the Jaycees were an expressive association, concluding that such right should not be extended 
to commercial entities. Id. at 633. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that the requirement “raises 
the possibility that certain commercial associations, by engaging occasionally in certain kinds of 
expressive activities, might improperly gain protection for discrimination.”). 
 34. Id. at 627–28. 
35.  Id. at 627 (rejecting the organization’s claim that “admission of women as full voting members 
[would] impede” the organization’s right to full expressive association by noting that such admission 
would “[impose] no restrictions on the organization’s ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or 
philosophies different from those of its existing members”). 
 36. Id. at 626 (quoting U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1570 (8th Cir. 1983)). 
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found that including women would not “impede the organization’s ability 
to engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred 
views.”37  A group’s beliefs and aims, in short, must somehow be related to 
its membership criteria.38  In effect, the Court said that Jaycees could still 
foster success of young men even if they were required to include women. 
Even though the Court ruled against the Jaycees, it did not claim that 
the Jaycees were not an expressive association.  As a matter of fact, the 
Court recognized that there was speech activity that should be protected.  
Only that the nature of the protection was not justified.39 
After Roberts, the right to exclude protection for an expressive 
association was expanded in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.40  There, the 
Court held that the freedom of association doctrine exempted the Boy 
Scout’s discriminatory practices against gays from state regulation.41  The 
Boy Scouts of America (“BSA”) historically did not allow gay men to 
become scoutmasters.  They indicated that allowing such men to become 
scoutmasters was inconsistent with their long and widely held values.  The 
Court agreed with the BSA and held that a regulation requiring the hiring 
of gay men and straight men equally would frustrate the speech that the 
BSA promulgated and “affect[] in a significant way the group’s ability to 
advocate public or private viewpoints.”42 
We can again analyze the case with the same three-part test. In 
holding that the BSA was an expressive association, the Court noted that 
the designation of expressive association is “not reserved for advocacy 
groups.  But to come within its ambit, a group must engage in some form of 
expression, whether it be public or private.”43  The BSA’s mission is to 
instill “values in young people.”44  The BSA imparts these values by having 
its adult leaders spend time with the youth members, instructing and 
engaging with them in activities including fishing and camping.  During 
this time with the youth members, “the scoutmasters and assistant 
scoutmasters inculcate them with the Boy Scouts’ values — both expressly 
 
 37. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627. 
 38. Bezanson et al., supra note 16, at 30. 
 39. Id. at 32. 
 40. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).  I discuss the implications and details of this 
expansion below in the context of corporations as expressive associations. 
 41. See id. at 655. 
 42. Id. at 648. 
 43. Id. This an important point that the Court makes.  It opens the door to organizations (and 
maybe corporations as I argue below) claiming to be expressive associations even though their primary 
objective might not be promulgation of speech.  From the Court’s discussion in Dale, it seems that 
simply some message or some speech is sufficient to fail within the purview of an expressive 
association. 
 44. Id. at 649.  
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and by example.”45  It was thus clear to the Court that the BSA was an 
expressive association.  In order to determine the substance of the BSA’s 
speech, the Court looked to its mission, the BSA case briefs and interviews 
with high-level scoutmasters.  The Court focused particularly on the Scout 
Oath and Law values of living life “morally straight” and “clean.”46  It 
determined, while giving much deference to the BSA’s own assertion of 
the meaning of these terms, that the BSA “teach[es] that homosexual 
conduct is not morally straight,” and that it does “not want to promote 
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”47 
Having determined the BSA’s speech was one of anti-gay sentiments, 
the Court went on to determine if allowing a gay scoutmaster would 
subvert the speech.  Here, the Court looked to the facts of the case. Dale 
was an openly gay scoutmaster and an open advocate for the gay 
movement.  The Court held that as such, his presence was “forc[ing] the 
organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, 
that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conducts as a legitimate form of 
behavior.”48  Effectively, requiring the BSA to employ an openly gay 
scoutmaster like Dale would subvert the mission and speech of the 
expressive association.  Therefore, the right to exclude was protected. 
Later, the Court made a distinction in Rumsfeld v. Forum of Academic 
and Institutional Rights, Inc.49 between excluded members being a part of 
the group in a fundamental way and those members simply interacting with 
the group as an “outsider.”50  Rumsfeld contemplated military recruitment 
on law school campuses.  Law schools attempted to restrict recruiters from 
interviewing on campus as the military was, at the time, an institution that 
discriminated against gays (the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Policy).51  Congress 
then passed the Solomon Amendment that restricted a school from getting 
federal funds if they did not allow military recruitment on campus.52 
The Court did recognize that schools could legally argue the 
expressive association exemption even though they were not what we 
typically think of as voluntary expressive associations, but rather 
universities.53  The schools’ speech then was to protest the exclusion of 
 
 45. Dale, 530 U.S. 649–50. 
 46. Id. at 650. 
 47. Id. at 651. The Court looked to a 1978 position statement signed by Downing B. Jenks and 
Harvey L. Price (then President and Chief Scout Executive respectively) to determine the BSA’s 
viewpoint on homosexuality.  Based upon this statement and another 1991 position statement, the Court 
determined that homosexuality was at odds with the mission and speech activity of the BSA. 
 48. Id. at 653. 
 49. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 49 (2006). 
 50. See generally Sonu Bedi, Expressive Exclusion: A Defense, 7 J. MORAL PHIL. 427, 431 (2010). 
 51. See generally Rumsfeld, 547 U.S at 47. 
 52. Id. at 52. 
 53. Bedi, supra note 50, at 431. 
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gays in the military.  The Court ruled, however, that unlike in Dale, the 
military was not asking to become an insider in the university, or a member 
of the university.  Rather the military was simply asking permission to be 
on campus and “associate” loosely with the school.54  As such, the Court 
ruled that the Solomon Amendment was constitutional as applied to the 
schools.  The Court here implicitly said that the schools’ speech would not 
be harmed or frustrated by allowing the military recruiters. 
From the above survey of the Court’s recent jurisprudence, it is clear 
that the speech that is generally at issue is the type of speech that we as a 
society might find problematic.55  Speech advocating the exclusion of 
women, the exclusion of gays and the exclusion of non-Catholics are all 
types of “dissenting speech.”56  In order to receive exclusion protection, 
this dissenting speech must also be subverted by relevant state or federal 
regulation (Alabama corporate law, Minnesota Human Rights, Title VII).57  
Finally, the speech must be “public.”  It is not enough that the Jaycees or 
the Boy Scouts exclude women and gays in their living room.58 
Ultimately, the following characterization of the protected expressive 
association exclusion nicely summarizes its scope and purpose: 
 
[E]xpressive exclusion creates space for democratic dissent 
— space that serves as a genuine counter to the majority’s 
decision.  Such exclusion requires there to be an association, 
that a group of individuals share a message.  The association 
must also proffer a public message — one that is heard by 
all; one that is in the “public” sphere.  Expressive exclusion 
generates genuine room for dissent allowing a group to 
question, to doubt, to push up against an otherwise valid 
norm by excluding individuals.59 
 
 54. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 69.  
 55. In order for the right to be implicated in the first instance, there must be some government 
regulation that seeks to prohibit the discrimination: presumably because the discrimination is not widely 
socially accepted. 
56.  See Bedi, supra note 50, at 432; see also Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (finding that the Mormon church’s firing of a non-Mormon janitor over 
religious reasons was protected by exemption under the Civil Rights Act because government 
intervention would interfere with the religious mission of the Mormon church); NANCY ROSENBLUM, 
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST 
DEMOCRACIES 171 (2000). 
 57. Bedi, supra note 50, at 438. 
 58. This would fall under the intimate association prong and hence would not even come under the 
state’s regulation generally.  Each of the  state regulations in Roberts, Dale, and Rumsfeld were 
concerned with organizations that present themselves to the public.  The state does not purport to 
regulate “private” or individual discriminatory behavior.  See generally Bedi, supra note 50; see also 
Stuart White, Freedom of Association and the Right to Exclude, 5 J. POL. PHIL. 373–91 (1997). 
 59. Bedi, supra note 50, at 438. 
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This article argues below that this characterization of expressive 
associations might include for-profit corporations in the wake of expanding 
First Amendment protection to such corporations.60 
 
III.  CORPORATIONS AS EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATIONS 
 
The above discussion sets the stage for what kinds of associative 
speech the Court protects even in face of clear discrimination.  This section 
will discuss the potential for “for-profit” corporations to be viewed as 
expressive associations. 
Corporations might now meet the first prong of the test as described 
above.  That is to say that expanding First Amendment protections for 
corporations makes it more likely that they will be seen as partaking in 
protected speech. 
This section will first describe and analyze the expanded First 
Amendment protections of the recent cases Citizen’s United and Hobby 
Lobby.  If corporations have protected political speech and can exercise 
religion for very specific purposes, then it stands to say that they may be 
considered expressive associations giving them the right to exclude 
members who frustrate their speech.  It will conclude with a detailed 
discussion and argument for how a for-profit corporation can be viewed as 
an expressive association. 
 
A.  CITIZENS UNITED 
 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission was a landmark 
Supreme Court case that in a basic sense, expanded the First Amendment 
political speech right for corporations, unions, and nonprofits.61 
Citizens United was a conservative nonprofit lobby group who wanted 
to broadcast and air a film that was critical of Hilary Clinton.  It wanted to 
do this thirty days before the 2008 Democratic primaries where Hilary 
Clinton along with Barack Obama were the frontrunners for the 
presidential nomination.  Citizens United, however, was limited by section 
203 of the  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.  The Act prohibited 
corporations and unions from making any “contribution or expenditure” on 
any “electioneering communications”62 within thirty days before a primary 
 
 60. Note that we will have to determine whether the company promulgates any speech, and what 
that speech is before we can begin to determine what exemptions, if any, corporations should receive.  
This will be further explored in Part IV below. 
 61. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310. 
 62. Defined as broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which refers to a clearly identified 
candidate for federal office. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(A)(i) (2015) (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 434). 
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or sixty days before a general election.63  The intent of the statute was to 
prevent large corporations and very rich companies from unfairly 
influencing elections.64 
The film “Hilary: The Movie”65 was deemed an “electioneering 
communication” and hence the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia held that the statute applied to restrict Citizens United from 
attempting to broadcast the movie.66  Citizens United, however, thought 
that they had precedent to broadcast the movie.  Previously, they had 
brought two separate complaints to the FEC for another political movie 
made by Michael Moore, “Fahrenheit 911.”  Both of these complaints 
were dismissed: one because the time frame of Moore’s movie fell outside 
the thirty/sixty day limit and the other because the movie was seen as 
commercial activity as opposed to campaign expenditures.67  Given the 
Moore movie, Citizens United thought they would be able to advertise their 
movie.  However, the District Court ruled that the advertisement of the 
movie did not fall outside the thirty/sixty day limit and, as such, was 
banned by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.68 
Citizens United appealed the lower court decision to the Supreme 
Court and sought injunctive relief against the FEC.  The Court held that the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act as applied to corporations was 
unconstitutional and abridged the fundamental right of free speech codified 
in the First Amendment.69  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion proceeded 
in three parts.  First, he articulated the fundamental importance of the First 
Amendment and that political contributions were clearly a class of 
protected speech.70  Second, he articulated that “electioneering 
communications” were political speech and hence were protected under the 
First Amendment.71  Third (and probably most controversial), the opinion 
 
 63. See 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a), (c)(1) (2015) (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 441b); see also 52 U.S.C.§ 
30104(f) (2015). 
64.  For a fuller discussion of the purposes of the statute, see Frank J. Favia, Jr., Enforcing the 
Goals of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: Silencing Nonprofit Groups and Stealth PACS in 
Federal Elections, 5 U. ILL. L. REV.1081 (2006). 
 65. See Hilary The Movie: About the Film, (2008), http://www.hillarythemovie.com/about.html 
(describing the film and its contents). 
 66. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275 (D.D.C. 2008), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 67. See Bradley A. Smith & Michael E. Toner, Fed. Election Comm’n, MUR 507, Moore et al., 
(determining the movie fell within the thirty/sixty time limit of the statute) (2004); First Gen. Counsel’s 
Rep., Lawrence H. Norton et al., Fed. Election Comm’n, MURs 5474 and  5539, Clausnitzer et al., 
 (concluding the film and its trailers “represent bona fide commercial activity, which the commission 
has previously declined to regulate”) (2005). 
 68. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 282. 
 69. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66. 
70.   Id.  
71.   Id.  
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argued that individuals and associations of individuals had always received 
First Amendment protection and that corporations were nothing more than 
associations of individuals.72  Therefore, corporations must be given First 
Amendment protection for political speech including the right to make 
expenditures for “electioneering communications.” 
Kennedy first articulated the fundamental importance of the First 
Amendment.  Particularly, that the importance of being able to provide 
dissenting political opinions was at the basis of free speech.  He remarked 
“speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold 
officials accountable to the people.”73  The doctrine was, in its first form, 
geared to make sure that citizens could criticize their leaders and the state 
in order to foster a fully democratic state.74 
Justice Kennedy then made clear that the speech at issue was political 
speech as opposed to lower valued neutral reporting.75  He argued that “in 
light of historical footage, interviews with persons critical of her, and 
voiceover narration, the film would be understood by most viewers as an 
extended criticism of Senator Clinton’s character and her fitness for the 
office of the Presidency.”76  As such, this was meant to be a critique of 
Clinton and hence was dissenting political speech.77  Since this speech was 
political in nature, the Court must view the regulation and restriction with 
strict scrutiny: i.e. the government must prove that the regulation “furthers 
a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”78 
Justice Kennedy’s final argument drew upon how First Amendment 
protections should apply even to corporate entities, so that they can 
effectively participate in the political process.79  He argued initially that the 
Political Action Committee (“PAC”) form of association was not a 
sufficient means of speech for corporations.  Corporations can create PACs 
in order to contribute to the political process, but these PACs are distinct 
from the corporations.  Further, they “are burdensome alternatives; they are 
 
72.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66.   
 73. Id. at 339. 
 74. Id. (“The First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered 
during a campaign for political office.” (quoting Eu v. San Francisco Cty Democratic Cent. Comm., 
489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)); see generally RONALD J. COLOMBO, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE 
BUSINESS CORPORATION (2014). 
 75. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 326–29. 
 76. Id. at 325. 
 77. Id. at 325–26 (quoting several aspects of the movie to show it was clearly meant as a mode of 
dissent and to build fervor and turn votes against Clinton). 
 78. Id. at 340. 
 79. Id. at 314–15 (holding the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act unconstitutional as applied to both 
for-profit and nonprofit corporations).  Even though Citizens United was a nonprofit, the Court 
explicitly held that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act was unconstitutional as to all companies, even 
for-profit corporations. 
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expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations.”80  As such, 
the prohibition of  “corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on 
speech.”81 
Justice Kennedy then went on to note that corporations have always 
been given the freedom of speech and First Amendment protection has 
“been extended by explicit holdings to the context of political speech.”82  
Most importantly for him was that the source of the speech cannot by itself 
rationalize a proscription on the speech.  Effectively, Justice Kennedy 
argued that it was just as important to protect corporate speech as it was to 
protect individual speech, even though corporations were not “natural 
persons.”83  He remarked “political speech does not lose First Amendment 
protection ‘simply because its source is a corporation.’”84 
In finding that corporate political speech should be protected, the 
Court overturned its holding in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce.85  In Austin, the Court upheld a Michigan prohibition on 
independent corporate expenditures “that supported or opposed any 
candidate for state office.”86  In that case, the Court found persuasive the 
possibility of corporations artificially swaying public opinion by the 
amount of expenditures that they were able to use.  Specifically, the Court 
in Austin was sensitive to “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate 
form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas.”87  In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy 
criticized the holding in Austin by arguing that setting a precedent that 
allowed the government to restrict corporate speech would effectively 
render corporate speech useless. 
Kennedy saw Austin as a check on the political power of a corporation 
— that allowing corporations to speak would give them an unfair 
advantage in the political process.  But he contrasted this rationale of anti-
distortion by showing that the Court had previously “rejected the premise 
that the Government has an interest ‘in equalizing the relative ability of 
 
 80. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339 (arguing that PAC restrictions make corporate political speech 
inefficient because “a corporation may not be able to establish a PAC in time to make its views known 
regarding candidates and issues”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 342. 
 83. Id. at 343. 
 84. Id. at 342 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)). 
 85. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1989). 
 86. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 347 (discussing the  Michigan law in Austin). 
 87. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
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individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.’”88  Allowing 
corporations to take part in the political process would not constitute a risk 
of corruption.89  Finally, in concluding its argument, the Court made clear 
that some people would appreciate the movie’s dissenting speech and that 
the First Amendment gives people and corporations the freedom to 
innovate and use new types of media and communication in order to 
disseminate their speech.  Justice Kennedy’s concluding remarks state: 
“Citizens [United] must be free to use new forms, and new forums, for the 
expression of ideas.  The civic discourse belongs to the people, and the 
Government may not prescribe the means used to conduct it.”90 
 
B. HOBBY LOBBY 
 
After extending the right of political speech to for-profit corporations, 
the Court contemplated whether or not the owner’s of a for-profit 
corporation could exercise religion under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) through a corporate entity.  In Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby,91 the Court ruled in the affirmative and held that as a closely-held 
corporation, Hobby Lobby, did exercise religion as to exempt itself from 
the federal contraception requirement. 
Hobby Lobby was founded by the Green family.  What started as a 
small arts-and-crafts store grew to a nationwide chain that employed over 
13,000 employees and operated 500 brick-and-mortar stores.92  The Greens 
were very religious and wanted to run their company with a Christian 
framework in mind.  Hobby Lobby’s mission statement includes “honoring 
the Lord in all [they] do by operating the company in a manner consistent 
with Biblical principles.”93  Hobby Lobby intended to “operate in a 
professional environment founded upon the highest ethical, moral, and 
 
88.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976)).  Kennedy 
also made his dissatisfaction with Austin clear by arguing that Austin went against both the founders’ 
notion of free speech and the “open marketplace of ideas.”  Id. at 353–54. 
 89. Id. at 350. Note that the dissent (and the majority opinion for that matter) spends a large 
amount of time arguing that giving expenditure rights to corporations would create corruption.  See 
generally Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance after 
Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643 (2011).  This discussion however is not relevant to 
corporate employment discrimination. The risk of political speech swaying opinion is of greater 
significance than any discrimination speech.  As such, this article does not attempt to summarize or 
argue the merits of the corruption or swaying of public opinion arguments. 
 90. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 91. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751. 
 92. Id. at 2765.  Another closely held company, Conestoga, was also at issue in the case.  Since the 
rationale of the decision applied exactly the same to both Hobby Lobby and Conestoga, I will only 
discuss Hobby Lobby here.  But it should be noted that the Court applied the same analysis to 
Conestoga to hold that it also exercised religion. 
 93. Id. at 2770 n. 23. 
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Christian principles.”94  Furthermore, the Court noted that each family 
member had signed an agreement as to run the business in “accordance 
with the family’s religious beliefs.”95 
Hobby Lobby took issue with a portion of the Department of Health 
and Human Services (“HHS”) mandate to provide a health policy that 
includes contraception to their employees.96  According to Hobby Lobby, 
contraception goes against strict Christian principles.  As such, the 
company wanted an exemption from having to supply contraception.  The 
HHS did indeed have a religious exemption from its regulations under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.  It held that an 
organization could be exempted from providing contraception if it were a 
nonprofit organization that “holds itself out as a religious organization and 
opposes providing coverage for some or all of any contraceptive serves 
required to be covered . . . on account of religious objections.”97  Hobby 
Lobby, however, was a for-profit corporation and hence did not fit into this 
exemption. 
Instead, Hobby Lobby argued it fit in another exemption passed by 
Congress, specifically the RFRA.  The RFRA exemption states that a 
government’s regulation must receive strict scrutiny if the regulation 
“substantially burden[s] a person’s exercise of religion.”98  Hobby Lobby 
argued that it was a “person” under the statute and hence was a protected 
organization under the RFRA and that it effectively could and did exercise 
its religion.  If this were the case, then this would give Hobby Lobby an 
exemption to the HHS mandate. Hobby Lobby simply would have to show 
that its religion (Christianity) did not allow the use of contraception 
(something relatively easy to show).  Then, requiring Hobby Lobby to 
provide contraception insurance would effectively be substantially 
burdening the exercise of its religion. 
The Court agreed with Hobby Lobby in holding that they were 
protected “persons” under RFRA.  In its most bold statement, the majority 
argued that protecting the “free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby 
Lobby . . . protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control 
these companies.”99  In doing this, the Court departed from the widely held 
notion that people incorporate so as to distance a company’s actions away 
from the individual shareholders.100 
 
 94. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764. 
 95. Id. at 2766. 
 96. Id. at 2759 (holding that HHS’s regulation was an interpretation of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010). 
 97. Id. at 2763 (quoting 45 CFR § 147.131(b)). 
 98. Id. at 2767 (quoting 42 U.S.C § 2000bb-1(a)). 
 99. Id. at 2768. 
 100. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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The dissent argued that this view of for-profit corporations is more 
akin to a nonprofit organization, because furthering “their religious 
autonomy . . . often furthers individual religious freedom as well.”101  It 
argued that since the owners of Hobby Lobby came together to make a 
company they “cannot sue because they seek to make a profit for their 
owners, and the owners cannot be heard because the [RFRA] applies only 
to the companies and not the owners as individuals.”102 
The majority, however, did not agree with this reasoning. It argued 
that the furthering of a for-profit company’s religion also furthers the 
shareholder’s individual religious freedom.103  And that the profit-making 
objective of a for-profit corporation is not enough to hold that it also cannot 
have a religious exercise objective.104  It argued that several companies 
have motives and missions at the expense of profits.  They even might 
pursue these missions even though they decrease profits.105  The majority 
believed that the free exercise protection granted to a nonprofit religious 
institution must be equally applied to Hobby Lobby (a for-profit 
corporation which has religious owners).106  It is this move that provides 
the basis for treating for-profit corporations as expressive associations.  
Effectively, the Court held that the coming together and associating of 
people to make profit did not preclude the fact that they still, through the 
corporate form, could practice their religion.  The Court’s reasoning used 
an associative view of the company (i.e., that a company fundamental 
right’s arise from the associative rights of the individuals who create 
them).107 
The Court also made clear that this ruling was limited to closely-held 
corporations.  That, since shareholder views and interests could differ in 
large publicly held corporations, granting these large publicly corporations 
the right to exercise religion would not arise.108  However, after doing this, 
the Court then rejected the dissent’s arguments that shareholders in larger 
 
 101. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Amos, 483 U.S. at 342). 
 102. Id. at 2767 (explaining the position of HHS that the Dissent endorsed). 
 103. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769.  
 104. Id.  The Court made this argument by referring to its decision in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 
599 (1961) where the Court entertained “the free-exercise claims of individuals who were attempting to 
make a profit as retail merchants.”  Id. at 2769–70. 
 105. Id.  (“For-profit corporations, with ownership approval, support a wide variety of charitable 
causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to further humanitarian and other altruistic 
objectives.”);  see generally Company Fact Sheet, CHIK-FIL-A, http://www.chick-fil-a.com/Company/ 
Highlights-Fact-Sheets (last visited Nov. 2015) (providing a discussion of how Chik-Fil-A adopts 
religious practices). 
 106. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771. 
 107. Id. at 2768.  This treatment and view of the firm is very similar to how the Court views 
expressive associations.  I argue below that this view of the firm can create an associative corporate 
right to exclude. 
 108. Id. at 2775. 
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more diverse corporations could disagree on religious viewpoints.  The 
majority argued that “state corporate law provides a ready means for 
resolving any conflicts” between shareholders.109  So, on the one hand, the 
Court rejects the notion that this holding can be expanded to larger 
corporations, and it, at the same time, defends the holding on the grounds 
that even though large companies might disagree on speech, corporate law 
exists to protect it.  As I will show below, this line of reasoning can easily 
be read to predict that the right to exercise religion cannot logically be 
limited to a closely held corporation.110 
Ultimately, the Court held that Hobby Lobby was exercising its 
religion and that as such, it was protected under the RFRA, so a strict 
scrutiny test would apply to the HHA regulation.111  It then determined that 
the regulation could not be upheld with the Court’s strict scrutiny standard 
(the classical standard that applies when religious regulation is at issue).  
The crux of the case’s holding, for this article’s purpose, is the 
determination that a closely held for-profit corporation’s owners could 
exercise religion through the corporate form, and that the exercise is 
protected. 
 
C.  THE EXPRESSIVE CORPORATION 
 
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby have opened the door for for-profit 
corporations to be considered expressive associations under the freedom of 
association jurisprudence.  At the outset, it is important to recognize that 
there are several types of for-profit entities (closely held corporations, 
partnerships, benefit corporations, publicly traded corporations, just to 
name a few).  It is possible that different for-profits could be more easily 
seen as expressive associations. 
Ronald Colombo argues that there are two relevant types of for-profit 
corporations: modern and postmodern.112  In his view, the modern 
corporation represents our generally held beliefs about corporations (e.g., 
they are only created for profit, they have shareholder and manager 
separation of ownership, and at all times seek to advance shareholder 
 
 109. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.  The Court is generally pointing to shareholder derivative 
lawsuits and the selling of public stock. 
 110. A more detailed discussion of differing shareholder values and speech is discussed below. 
 111. The strict scrutiny analysis occurred after the Court determined that Hobby Lobby did in fact 
exercise religion.  The analysis is a standard First Amendment determination when religious regulation 
is at issue.  This portion of the opinion and this jurisprudence although important is not relevant for this 
Article.  What is relevant for my purposes is only that Hobby Lobby was seen as a for-profit 
corporation that could have religious views.  As such, the discussion does not include the Court’s 
discussion of the strict scrutiny analysis. 
 112. COLOMBO, supra note 74, at 55. 
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primacy).  In particular, modern corporations do not “espouse values.”113 
These (more traditional) corporations, Colombo argues, generally 
would not be seen as having speech distinct from their for-profit motives, 
and such viewing these as expressive associations is difficult.114  He argues, 
“[C]onstrained by the shareholder primacy norm, the directors of the 
modern corporation are arguably precluded from ordinarily pursuing 
anything other than profit maximization.”115  Postmodern corporations, 
however, in Colombo’s view, have evolved so as to bring together people 
not just for profit maximizing motives, but for other nonbusiness motives 
that could very well include speech.  These (newer) corporations build into 
their charter sensibilities of charity, religion, stakeholder interests and other 
mechanisms that could even decrease profits.  These corporations, he 
argues, can more easily be seen as expressing speech and being treated as 
expressive associations because they have come together “around a 
common vision or shared set of goals, values, and/or beliefs beyond those 
that are simply financial in nature.”116 
This dichotomy misses the point because corporations today can be 
both modern and postmodern.  The ability to systematically distinguish 
between the two is very difficult at the outset.  Colombo does not hinge this 
distinction on corporate structure or number of shareholders.  Actually, it is 
unclear on his account what would distinguish these types of firms (only 
that different ones exist).  Companies might have characteristics of both 
postmodern and modern corporations.  As such, it is difficult to say that 
some for-profit corporations can get expressive association protection and 
others cannot simply because they have unique characteristics. 
The distinction does not do any work at the outset. Rather, the 
distinction might come into play with how much deference we give to the 
various companies.  But if some for-profits are expressive associations, 
then it seems reasonable to grant all corporations the right. (The Citizens 
United Court would agree in this sense as it does not distinguish between 
various types of for-profit companies).  However, even if one were to 
consider Colombo’s distinction relevant, I still posit and show below that 
treating post-modern companies including closely held companies as 
expressive associations can have perverse outcomes. 
In this article, for simplicity, the definition of “for-profit corporations” 
is meant to include all of these various corporate forms.  At the end of the 
 
 113. COLOMBO, supra note 74, at 56. 
 114. Although he does not explicitly say this, there is a sense that part of the problem with the 
modern corporation is that they have several shareholders and might not have shareholder unity when it 
comes to speech. 
 115. COLOMBO, supra note 74, at 56. 
 116. Id.  Presumably Hobby Lobby would be a postmodern corporation. 
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day, the differing structures are very important, and different structures 
might get different protections.  However, the initial determination of 
whether for-profit corporations as a whole are expressive associations 
should apply to all for-profit corporate structures.117 
Moving to the crux of the argument, the definition of an expressive 
association has expanded while the definition of the purpose of a 
corporation has equally expanded so as to align how the Court views both 
corporations and expressive associations.  More specifically in light of both 
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby the speech rights of a corporation seem 
to be best articulated as associative rights of the individuals in the 
corporations. 
Initially, an expressive association was the coming-together of like-
minded people in order to engage in only those activities protected by the 
First Amendment.  This was the view of an expressive association under 
Roberts and NAACP.118  An expressive association was seen as a unified 
form of expression.  The like-minded individuals came together to 
promulgate and exercise speech that they were unified in, i.e., the members 
of these associations had similar views of the First Amendment activity 
they were engaging in.  As a matter of fact, this was the exact reason why 
they associated.  Roberts stands for the proposition that if organizations are 
not primarily expressive associations they will not be able to use the right 
to exclude to discriminate against employees.119  They will not be able to 
“package themselves as such to avoid application of state anti-
discrimination laws.”120  In effect, where the group is not purely expressive, 
“the right to associate for expressive purposes is not . . . absolute.”121  It is, 
however, important to note here that Justice O’Connor in her concurring 
opinion already thought the Court went too far in holding that the Jaycees 
were an expressive association.  She argued that the court “raises the 
possibility that certain commercial associations, by engaging occasionally 
 
 117. It is probably the case that there is a scale of protection that the Court would employ.  Certain 
companies (closely held corporations and partnership) might get more deference and protection with 
their speech than other companies (publicly held companies).  This however, goes to a determination 
after we have determined whether for-profit companies are expressive associations in the first instance. 
 118. See generally Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609 (noting that the Court has long recognized a right to 
associate for the purpose of activities protected by the First Amendment, a right implicated by the 
actions of United States Jaycees); Patterson, 357 U.S. at 449 (holding that an organization’s 
membership lists were immune from state scrutiny because the contents of such lists so closely 
implicated the members’ right of association). 
 119. See Adrianne K. Zahner, Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Conflicts between 
Antidiscrimination Laws and Freedom of Expressive Association after Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 
77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 373, 384, 386 (2001) (arguing that Dale expanded the scope of potential 
discrimination by allowing an expressive association to have a purpose other than dissemination of 
speech). 
 120. Id. at 395. 
 121. Id. at 396. 
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in certain kinds of expressive activities, might improperly gain protection 
for discrimination.”122 
On the corporate side, using the above framework, we can argue that 
initially we thought of corporations as associations where like-minded 
people come together to engage in the unified purpose of profit seeking 
activity.  This exclusive profit motive of corporations has been well-
documented.123  The general tenement of corporate law is that managers 
should run a corporation so as to maximize the profit (residual value) that 
goes to the shareholders.124 
The definition of expressive association, however, was expanded in 
Dale.125  In Dale, the Court expressively held that the Boy Scouts were 
promulgating anti-gay speech even though there might have not been 
membership unity.  There, the Court, while allowing the Boy Scouts to 
have a homophobic message, argued that “the First Amendment simply 
does not require that every member of a group agree on every issue in order 
for the group’s policy to be ‘expressive association.’”126 We then have a 
new definition of expressive association — the coming-together of people 
in order to engage in First Amendment activities not necessarily shared in 
unison.  Furthermore, Dale also broadened what exactly an organization 
needs to do to gain expressive association status.  The Court held that 
“associations do not have to associate for the ‘purpose’ of disseminating a 
certain message to be entitled to the protections of the First 
Amendment.”127  Colombo argues that “[Dale] is profound, as it signaled a 
shift away from an interpretation of Roberts that required a group to be 
initially identified as an expressive association in order to invoke the 
freedom of association.”128 
Even though Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion in Roberts 
cautioned the Court to not grant expressive association status to 
commercial entities,129 the Court in Citizens United expanded the scope of 
 
 122. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 632 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor correctly anticipated 
the concern of this Article before Dale and Citizens United.  
 123. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507 (1919); see also COLOMBO, supra note 
74, at 54–56.  Note that corporations can come together for any legal purpose and can write in their 
charter that they should give profits away or run a company in a certain way.  This, without more, is not 
problematic.  It is only when the State imposes a regulation on a corporation that limits its speech and 
associated activity where this analysis becomes relevant.  See also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1994). 
 124. Dodge, 204 Mich. at 507 (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the shareholders.”).  For a more recent similar view of corporate shareholder value see eBay 
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 125. COLOMBO, supra note 74, at 180–83. 
 126. Dale, 530 U.S. at 655 (2000). 
 127. Id. 
 128. COLOMBO, supra note 74, at 180. 
 129. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 634. 
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what kinds of activities corporations can partake in by extending to for-
profit corporations a constitutional right to protected free speech.  The 
Court effectively acknowledged that corporations can be created for 
activities other than making profit — i.e., corporations can be created in 
order to promulgate political speech.  If this were not enough, the Court 
also held that this political speech need not be unified.  Meaning that all 
members or shareholders of the corporation need not exactly agree with the 
political speech that the corporation is expressing.  The majority in Citizens 
United argued over the dissent’s objection of heterogeneous shareholder 
interests.  Justice Kennedy argued for the majority that if shareholders did 
not like the speech that a company was promulgating, they could 
effectively raise these concerns through “the procedures of corporate 
democracy.”130  Presumably, also, the shareholders could simply sell their 
shares.  This especially holds true in a public company that is traded on a 
stock exchange.  So, effectively, again using the same framework, we can 
view a corporation as an association of people in order to engage in the 
unified activity of profit making and the non-unified activity of political 
speech. 
In Hobby Lobby, the Court attempted to slightly rein in its expansive 
view of the corporation.  In this case, the Court held that shareholders could 
exercise their religion through the corporate for-profit form (for the limited 
purposes of the RFRA statute) as long as it was a closely held corporation. 
In this way, the Court acknowledged, as it did in Dale and in Citizens 
United, that the corporation’s purpose could be activity other than profit 
making (in this case exercising religion), but that this other activity should 
generally be unified.131  The Court put a large emphasis on the fact that this 
ruling was only appropriate because it was clear that all the shareholders 
(members) were unified in wanting the company to be run with a religious 
mindset.  Again using the same freedom of association framework, we then 
have a further expanded view of corporations as an association of people in 
order to engage in the unified activity of profit making, the nonunified 
activity of political speech and the unified activity of exercising religion. 
We then arrive at two definitions that are very much parallel. 
Expressive associations are groups of people that engage in unified or 
nonunified First Amendment activities.  Corporations are now being seen 
as associations where people can come together to make profits or engage 
in unified or nonunified expressive speech (political, religious). They 
 
 130. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369–70.  For a discussion of how Citizens United protected non-
unified speech see Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder 
Voluntariness in Corporate Political Speech, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 53 (2009). 
 131. This is implicit in the holding being limited to closely held corporations.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2755. 
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further can “employ their speech for reasons not necessarily related to 
profit maximization.”132  The key step is the conceptualization that a 
corporation’s First Amendment corporate speech is protected through the 
associative rights of the individuals in the corporation. (i.e., the speech 
stems from the members of the corporation themselves.) 
First Amendment activities include both political speech and the  
exercise of religion.  But they also include social and economic speech.  It 
can be argued that as the Court has expanded protection to political speech 
and religion, it is only a matter of time before it expands protection to 
social and economic speech, as both are also integral to First Amendment 
activities.  Bezanson argues that “if prior experience with political or public 
issue boundaries in other First Amendment settings is any indication, the 
political speech boundary of Citizens United will be greatly broadened in 
future cases, and the Court may well ultimately conclude that all 
noncommercial speech by corporations is fully protected.”133 
All dissenting speech contributes to the political arena and is 
fundamental to a democracy.134  The expressive association right is meant 
to protect the coming together of individuals to express opinions about 
everything from social and economic concerns to political and religious 
views.135  It seems then we have arrived a framework for thinking about the 
activities of a corporation that is more less exactly aligned with the 
definition of expressive association. 
One can argue, however, that corporations are unique and distinct 
from organizations like the Jaycees and the Boy Scouts.  As such, 
corporations will not be seen as expressive associations due to their 
heterogeneous shareholders, i.e., the shareholders of a company might not 
necessarily agree on the company’s speech position (this is particularly the 
case for public companies).136  If Google were to posit some amount of 
political speech (say that it did not support Joe Biden running for 
president), it is unclear if that speech should be protected because every 
associated shareholder might not agree with it.  Shareholders in a public 
company are heterogeneous and could very well disagree on political 
ideology.  As such, treating Google like an expressive association might 
 
 132. COLOMBO, supra note 74, at 124. 
 133. Bezanson et al., supra note 16, at 52; see, e.g., Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 343–44 (1974) 
(abandoning as ungovernable the earlier matter of public concern standard). 
 134. See generally Bedi, supra note 50. 
 135. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (“According protection to collective effort on behalf of shared 
goals is especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident 
expression from suppression by the majority.”). 
 136. See generally Bezanson et al., supra, note 16, at 48–52.  Note that the dissent in Citizens 
United also brought up this argument so as to limit the expansion of First Amendment political 
protection to corporations. 
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not make sense because it would not be an outlet for the true expression of 
the company given that it is not clear what viewpoint the shareholders 
collectively hold (if any at all). 
Although a powerful critique, this just does not comport with either 
the freedom of association or corporate law cases discussed above.  Both 
explicitly allow for nonunified speech and activity to be protected.137  
Bezanson argues that Hobby Lobby is an attempt to limit speech of 
companies to those in which the shareholders have unity as to the relevant 
speech or activity.  This is a fair argument, but even if it were to be true, 
the vast number of corporations in the United States are not actually public 
corporations with thousands of shareholders.  Instead, they are mostly 
closelyheld with few shareholders which increases the potential for these 
shareholders to be unified in their speech.138  In any case, the argument that 
some companies have corporate structures that make defending their 
speech more difficult does not go to whether they are expressive 
associations, but instead goes to how much deference the Court will give to 
the company. 
As argued in Part IV, this line of criticism relies on the fact that the 
speech is completely unrelated to the purpose of the company (i.e., this 
speech at issue has nothing to do with the nature of the business).  
However, when the speech at issue is one that directly relates to the 
company’s business enterprise and hence profits, it can be argued 
persuasively that all shareholders probably do hold the same viewpoint by 
the fact that they hold the shares of the company.139  When this is the case, 
then the argument for protecting corporate expression falls within the 
purview of both Citizens United and Hobby Lobby — a conclusion we need 
to be very concerned about. 
One could also argue that corporate shareholders cannot associate for 
purposes other than profit making.  If they wanted to, then they should use 
another corporate form (i.e., the benefit corporation or the nonprofit 
designation).  The ability of companies however to exercise speech rights 
or religion through a for-profit corporate form does comport with the 
traditional economic theory of the firm.  This theory of the firm views 
corporate law not as “a set of immutable government commands issued on 
a take-it-or-leave-it basis . . .” but rather “as a nexus of contracts among 
 
 137. See Dale and Citizens United discussions above. 
 138. Even some very large companies are closely held.  Enterprise Holding is a company that owns 
the rental car agencies (Alamo, Enterprise, and National).  Enterprise is still a family-owned, closely 
held corporation. 
 139. This argument will be made clear in Part IV in particular, while showing that the company 
Hooters might be seen as an expressive association and have a certain speech that all shareholders 
would agree with and hence might get First Amendment protection. 
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suppliers or labor, capital, and other inputs.”140  With this view, 
shareholders come together to contract to exercise whatever legal action 
they want simply using the corporate form.141 
Another line of argumentation might be that corporations already get 
protected speech, so why is this any different?  The Court has recognized 
some limited amount of corporate speech in the past. The Court does 
protect so called “commercial speech.”  This is speech that is useful for 
marketing and “defending [a corporation’s] interest in the marketplace.”142  
This kind of speech is usually economic in nature and helps a company to 
facilitate whatever transaction for which it is organized.  Commercial 
speech for a for-profit company does not generally include religious, 
political or even social speech.143  Commercial speech therefore is limited 
in many ways by the government (preventing fraudulent and deceitful 
marketing).  However, the speech protected in Citizens United and in 
Hobby Lobby was not “commercial speech” as the Court usually defines it.  
The Court expanded the scope of protected corporate speech in these cases.  
In Citizens United, the protected speech was political speech designed to 
dissent against a political candidate.  In Hobby Lobby, the protected speech 
was religious in nature.  This speech is more important than commercial 
speech as evidenced by the fact that Court applies strict scrutiny to its 
regulation.144  It is true that religious speech gets more protection 
traditionally than social or economic speech.  However, if corporate speech 
is social in nature, as argued below, protecting it necessarily leads us to a 
protected right to exclude. 
Still yet, one could argue that if we are protecting for-profit as 
noncommercial speech, that does not give us insight into whose speech is 
being promulgated or protected.  Is it shareholder speech, board of director 
speech, or maybe employee speech?  This is a difficult question to resolve 
normatively.  Here the freedom of association jurisprudence is helpful. In 
Dale, the Court recognized that all members did not have the same anti-gay 
 
140.  Meese & Oman, supra note 6, at 8; see generally, Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 
ECONOMICA, Nov. 1937, at 386; Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, J. FIN. ECON., Oct. 1976, at 305; Scott 
E. Masten, A Legal Basis of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181 (1988). 
 141. For a more extensive discussion of Hobby Lobby and the theory of the firm see Meese & 
Oman, supra note 6 
 142. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 759–61 
(1976); see also Bezanson et al., supra note 16, at 50. 
 143. See generally Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (arguing that although commercial 
speech was not protected, the Court has subsequently given commercial speech qualified protection); 
see Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748 (an example of how commercial speech is now 
protected under the First Amendment). 
 144. See generally Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751. Commercial speech does not receive the same 
standard of review (it receives a more stringent review) as religious or political speech that was at issue 
in Hobby Lobby and Citizens United. 
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speech, but still held that the organization overall promulgated such speech.  
The Court there looked to the company’s activities, its policies and its 
public statements.145  In this way, a Court will likely look to a company’s 
charter, bylaws, employee policies and activities to determine what the 
company’s speech is.  These documents and activities are molded by not 
only the shareholders and managers but also the employees and consumers 
over the course of a company’s lifespan.  In this way, the speech protected 
represents many parties’ speech and many parties’ powers to influence 
corporate speech as the corporation evolves over time.146 
But, descriptively, this question might not seem to matter.  As 
corporate law is structured, only shareholders could really bring a suit on 
behalf of the company against a state imposed regulation.147  As such, the 
type of speech that is at issue will likely be defined by the shareholders of 
the company and maybe to a small degree by the board of directors. 
Finally, one could argue that corporations will attempt to disguise 
their questionable profit making activities by claiming that the activities are 
a type of protected speech.  This is an important and strong argument 
against treating corporations as expressive associations, but it misses the 
point.  Evaluating the extent of the speech comes after first determining if 
the corporation is an expressive association.  As shown in Part II, only after 
an organization is seen as an expressive association is the actual speech of 
the organization evaluated.  It very well might be the case that companies 
will attempt to use the expressive association jurisprudence in bad faith. 
(This is partly the reason for the article so as to warn of the dangers of 
viewing companies as expressive associations particularly after Citizens 
United and Hobby Lobby have opened the door.)  But this critique does not 
speak against treating the corporation as an expressive association in the 
first instance. 
Once we allow ourselves to view corporations as expressive 
associations in the same way we view the Boy Scouts, the Jaycees, or the 
KKK, it becomes incredibly difficult to limit and regulate the 
discriminatory behaviors that corporations will eventually partake in.  This 
is because discrimination can be tied to a company’s speech just as 
limitation of membership is tied to an organization’s speech.  As Colombo 
puts it, after Dale and Citizens United, the speech right encompasses “the 
 
 145. See generally Dale, 530 U.S. at 640. 
 146. A more detailed discussion of how corporate speech evolves and how shareholders, managers, 
employees and consumers affect the speech would be a very fruitful endeavor for this arena of 
scholarship.  See Meese & Oman, supra note 6, at 7–14. 
 147. Delaware statutory and case law hold that only a shareholder can bring an action on behalf of 
the company, a so called “derivative shareholder suit.”  See generally MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION 
ACT ch. 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.15 (AM. LAW INST. 
1994). 
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right to keep one’s membership private [and] even permits the association 
to deny membership, in contravention of antidiscrimination law, to those 
who would undermine its attempted expression.”148 
 
IV.  EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND THE EXPRESSIVE 
ASSOCIATION DEFENSE149 
 
As argued above, the labeling of a for-profit corporation as an 
expressive association might hold some weight given the Court’s recent 
jurisprudence.  The Court has effectively given corporations a free pass on 
the first prong of its three-part test.  The remaining sections detail how a 
corporation could pass the remaining parts two and three of the test.  If the 
Court were to extend the freedom of association right to for-profit 
corporations and if corporations were to pass all three parts of the test, it 
would create perverse consequences particularly for employment 
discrimination. 
The government allows a corporation to discriminate based upon 
gender, race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, age or handicap, for an 
important “business purpose” (necessity).  There has never been an 
argument and the Court has never acknowledged one that defends 
employment discrimination based upon the freedom of association.  
However, if corporations are deemed to be expressive associations like the 
Boy Scouts or Jaycees, they could use the freedom of association to 
exclude those people who frustrate their speech (i.e., deny those people 
employment). 
This section will proceed as follows.  It will first briefly show the 
Court’s jurisprudence for regulating employment discrimination.  In 
particular, it will explain the domain of the only real defense the Court 
hears (the business necessity defense).  It will then argue that treating a 
corporation as an expressive association gives corporations another defense 
under the freedom of association doctrine.  This defense can be seen as a 
distinct argument or simply a strengthening of the business necessity 
defense.  Part IV will then discuss the status of gender discrimination and 
show how two companies, Hooters and Abercrombie & Fitch might 
actually make a successful case for employment discrimination based upon 
the fact that it is an expressive association and the discrimination at issue 
should be protected speech. 
 
 148. COLOMBO, supra note 74, at 82. 
 149. For this section, I focus on social and political speech as opposed to religious speech. A 
discrimination defense should be limited to only those people who are “essential to the [group’s] 
expressive content” and necessary to the “preservation of its purpose and identity” as opposed to 
activities which “simply . . . generate revenues.”  Amos, 483 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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A.  EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND THE BFOQ DEFENSE 
 
The United States has had a tumultuous and long standing relationship 
with employment discrimination.  Legislation to address employment 
discrimination became a popular topic in the 1960s with the advent of the 
Civil Rights Movement. Out of the Civil Rights Movement came the 
federal government’s guidelines in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  These guidelines outlawed employment decisions by companies 
(hiring, firing, promotion, and conditions of benefits of employment) based 
upon any one of several categories.150  These categories have been labeled 
“protected classes.”  The categories as they were originally articulated were 
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”151  However, over the course 
of the history of Title VII, the kinds of protected classes have expanded by 
including things like handicap, age, and pregnancy.152  Title VII was 
premised on the fact that as a society we have an interest in protecting 
those people who are shut out from the labor market.  This interest is so 
important as to trump any personal freedom that a company has in carrying 
out its business.  Effectively, Title VII has made clear that there are some 
degrees of discrimination that should be outlawed even in the face of 
infringing upon a company’s property right to maximize profit. 
But it is important to note that this “police power” is not applicable to 
expressive associations.  The domain of Title VII is companies that affect 
commerce with more than fifteen employees.  Bona fide nonprofit 
membership organizations are exempt from having to comply.153  But note 
that just because you are a nonprofit membership organization, that does 
not automatically give you the right to discriminate.  After all, as described 
in Part II, the Jaycees would be exempt under Title VII, but the Court still 
held that Jaycees had to include women.  It is important to make clear then 
it is not the exemption from Title VII that is doing the work for Boy Scouts 
 
 150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), 2(e)(1) (2015). 
 151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2015). 
 152. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the agency that implements Title VII and 
has subsequently instated several further levels of protected class.  See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, Oct. 31, 1978, 92 Stat. 2076; Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 17, formerly § 16, Dec. 15, 1967, 81 Stat. 608, (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 634 
(2015)); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2015)).  Some states have even extended state regulations to cover 
discrimination by height or weight. See Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 37.2202 (2015).  Note also that several articles have been written on the history of Title VII and 
the justification for extending protected classes to include further the purpose of Title VII.  See, e.g., 
Sheila Hatami & David Zwerin, Educating the Masses: Expanding Title VII to Include Sexual 
Orientation in the Education Arena, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 311 (2007); Mandatory Maternity 
Leave: Title VII and Equal Protection, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1026 (1973). 
 153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2015). 
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or the Jaycees, rather, it is the doctrine of expressive association.  This is 
why even though for-profit companies are not exempt under Title VII, they 
still might receive protection on an independent ground as expressive 
associations. 
There are two types of discrimination that Title VII outlaws.  The first 
(not terribly relevant for this article) has been labeled “disparate impact” 
discrimination.154  This discrimination occurs when a company does not 
have a facially discriminatory intention in hiring decisions, but still 
effectively discriminates against a protected class.  This discrimination is 
not intent-based but instead results-based.  The assumption in disparate 
impact discrimination is that the employer does not intend or have any 
discriminatory views at the outset of the hiring process.  However, through 
the specific job interview or promotion scheme, the results of the process 
created drastic disparities in the employment of a protected class. 
A widely used example is the case of a firehouse.155  Fire Chiefs use 
several processes to determine who they should hire to be fire fighters.  
One process in the job interview is to carry a 150lb dummy down a flight 
of stairs.  This is meant to reproduce a firefighter carrying an unconscious 
body out of a burning building (something that we would want a firefighter 
to be able to easily do).  The problem here is that, on average, women are 
generally not as strong as men.  The percentage of men who can carry a 
150lb dummy down stairs is small as it is (it is a very difficult task).  But 
the percentage of women who could accomplish this same task is even 
smaller.  As such, we have firehouses that hire a disproportionate number 
of men as firefighters.  This hiring of men more than women effectively 
shuts women out of the firefighter labor market and constitutes disparate 
impact employment discrimination.  The job interview has a disparate 
impact on females, who are a protected class. 
Title VII builds in a very important exception to the disparate impact 
rule.  If the portion of the job interview that creates the disparate impact is 
necessary and essential for the intended job performance, then Title VII 
allows the presence of discrimination.156  In the firefighter case, the ability 
 
 154. For discussions of disparate impact discrimination see the following cases: EEOC v. Sambo's 
of Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 92 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1977); 
Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228 (2005), and the following journal articles: Richard A. 
Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010); Peter Siegelman, 
Contributory Disparate Impacts in Employment Discrimination Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 515 
(2007). 
 155. Ricci v. DeStanfo, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (a famous case of firefighter disparate impact; 
although, not for the reason specified here).  The issue in Ricci concerned white and Hispanic 
firefighters and competency written tests that had a disparate impact on Hispanics.  However, the 
firehouse did not promote the white firefighters who scored higher on the tests for fear of appearing 
discriminatory.  The white firefighters brought suit on a disparate impact ground.  Id. at 562. 
 156. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2015) (discussing the burden of proof in disparate impact cases). 
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to carry a dummy down a flight of stairs is critical to the duties of an 
effective and successful firefighter.  As such, this job interview task is 
justified and optimal, even though it creates a disparate impact under Title 
VII.  Therefore, firehouses continue to use this for job interviews and are 
protected for any disparate impact discrimination under Title VII.157 
The second type of discrimination occurs when an employer 
purposefully and facially makes hiring decision based upon the exact 
characteristics that distinguish protected classes from nonprotected ones.  
This discrimination is akin to choosing an employee because of the fact 
that they are a certain gender or a certain religion.  In the Deep South in the 
early 1960s, white employers only hired white employees because they 
“favored” them over black employees.  This was preference based 
employment discrimination.  This type of discrimination — I will term it 
“preferential discrimination” — is arguable more problematic because it 
relies upon some underlying assumption that a certain aspect of a protected 
class makes them more or less desirable.  As such, this type of 
discrimination is very difficult to justify and rarely gets approval so as to 
trump Title VII. 
Title VII does, however, provide a very limited defense against a 
preferential discrimination charge.  If successful under this exemption, a 
company can continue to make their preferential employment decision even 
though Title VII bans it.  This statutory defense is called the bona fide 
occupational qualification (“BFOQ”).  It reads in part: 
 
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of 
his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances 
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the 
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.158 
 
 157. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  In that case the Court found that Duke 
Power Co.’s job qualification process of having a high school diploma and receiving a certain score on 
an IQ test had a disparate impact on black workers.  Id. at 431.  As such these black workers received 
jobs in the company that were lower paying while white worker received the higher paying jobs.  Id. at 
428.  The Court found that the job requirements were not necessary to the job because there were 
already several white people performing high-paid jobs that did not have high school diplomas or high 
IQ test scores.  Id. at 431–32.  See also Peggy Young v. UPS, 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013).  This case 
concerns a pregnant delivery driver who was asked to go on maternity leave due to her pregnancy rather 
than given a position that was less strenuous.  Id. at 441.  The lower courts have held in favor of UPS 
while arguing that certain jobs require more physical labor and its appropriate for employers to 
discriminate against pregnant women in this way rather than provide accommodations.  Id. at 451. 
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2015).  When the term business necessity is used as a defense, it 
generally applies only to a defense against a disparate impact case.  This necessity defense in this article 
is focused on the BFOQ defense.  In that vein, I will use “BFOQ necessity” to make sure there is no 
confusion on which defense I am referring to. 
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It’s important to note that the BFOQ however, does not allow for 
preferential discrimination based upon race.159  The classic example of a 
BFOQ is the discrimination of employees in fashion.  If there is a fashion 
line that only carries men’s clothes, it only makes sense for an employer to 
hire male models to market the clothing. In effect it is “necessary to the 
normal operation” of the business.  Although maybe an easy case, the 
Court has developed a very confusing test on what counts as something that 
is “necessary to the normal operation” of a business.160  Even though the 
Court has used a multipart test over the course of BFOQ jurisprudence, the 
Court’s difficulty in understanding what’s necessary for a business to 
operate has contributed to the understandable confusion of the doctrine. 
There are generally three distinct tests that are sometimes employed 
together or separately in order to determine whether a discriminatory 
employment decision is a necessity for the BFOQ defense.161  The first is 
the “all or substantially all test,” the second is the “essence of the business 
test,” and the third is the alternative test.162 
In the first test, the Court determines whether all or substantially all of 
the members of the prejudiced class would be unable to perform the 
underlying duties of the relevant job.  For example, if an employer were to 
not hire women for a job that required a certain amount of weight lifted, the 
employer would have to prove that all or substantially all women could not 
lift the weight needed for the job.163  This test is generally used to evaluate 
gender specific discrimination based upon “physical ability, privacy 
concerns, or where pregnancy poses safety risks.”164 
The “essence of the business test” holds that discrimination is valid 
“only when the essence of the business operation would be undermined by 
not hiring members of one sex exclusively.165  The Fifth Circuit articulated 
this test in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.166  There, Pan 
 
 159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2015) (If we were to see the expressive association defense as 
distinct from the BFOQ, this would open the door to possibly allowing even racial discrimination.). 
 160. See generally Katie Manley, The BFOQ Defense: Title VII’s Concession to Gender 
Discrimination, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 169 (2009) (arguing that the BFOQ defense should be 
tightened so as to further protect from unwanted employment discrimination). 
 161. Id. at 174–76. 
 162. See generally BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
LAW 404–05 (4th ed. 2007). 
 163. See Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232–34 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that 
Southern Bell could not discriminate against women because some women could certainly lift the 
requisite weight (thirty pounds)). 
 164. Manley, supra note 160, at 174. For an extensive discussion of this test, see Amy Kapczynski, 
Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 112 YALE. L.J. 1257 (2003); Civil 
Rights—Dothard v. Rawlinson: A Method of Analysis for Future BFOQ Cases, 16 URB. L. ANN. 361 
(1979); John F. Cassibry, Title VII: Sex Discrimination and the BFOQ, 34 LA. L. REV. 3(1974). 
 165. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 166.  Id.  
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American Airlines attempted to only hire women as flight attendants.167  
The company argued that customers preferred female flight attendants to 
male ones.168  This type of “customer based” employment discrimination 
has generally been held to be unlawful under Title VII and is not protected 
under the BFOQ.  The Fifth Circuit in Diaz held that the essence of an 
airline was not to entice passengers or make them comfortable with flight 
attendants.  Instead, it was to take passengers safely from one place to 
another.  It held in part: 
 
The primary function of an airline is to transport passengers 
safely from one point to another.  While a pleasant 
environment, enhanced by the obvious cosmetic effect that 
female stewardesses provide as well as . . . their apparent 
ability to perform the non-mechanical functions of the job in 
a more effective manner than most men, may all be 
important, they are tangential to the essence of the business 
involved.  No one has suggested that having male stewards 
will so seriously affect the operation of an airline as to 
jeopardize or even minimize its ability to provide safe 
transportation from one place to another.169 
 
As a product of this case, the “essence of business” test is very 
difficult to pass.  The Court will likely always view the essence of a 
business as very narrow so as to prevent discrimination.170 
Finally, courts have used a third defense that requires defendants to 
“show that no reasonable, less discriminatory alternative exists, especially 
in cases where privacy is at issue.”171  In Hardin v. Stynchcomb, the Court 
held that a prison could not discriminate against female guards in a male 
prison because they could rearrange the duties of the security guards such 
that the prisoners’ right of privacy would not be infringed by the women.172 
The Court has employed the three tests separately and together in 
some instances.173  Some have argued that the tests are appropriately 
applied together because they are effectively targeted at different 
 
 167.  Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388. 
168.  Id.   
 169. Id. at 388. 
 170. Manley, supra note 160, at 175. 
 171. Id. at 176; see also LINDEMANN, supra note 162, at 409. 
 172. Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Manley, supra note 160, at 
175. 
 173. See Manley, supra note 160, at 176; see generally Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 
(1977) (discussing the various circumstances in which the tests are applied). 
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considerations.174  “The ‘essence of the business’ test considers whether the 
employee’s desired trait is essential for the business to run successfully, 
while the ‘all or substantially all’ test focuses on whether a class-based ban 
is the only feasible method of revealing those unable to perform the job.”175  
However, these tests are all one in the same.  They test whether or not the 
discrimination is necessary for the business to operate. By implementing 
these various tests to determine necessity, the Court skirts the critical 
issues: what should we consider a valid BFOQ necessity and how should 
be determine it.  Should we look at a company’s marketing materials, 
investor pitches, charter, constitution to determine necessity? 
There are three conceptions of what is necessary for a business. These 
three conceptions have their roots in economic theory.  The Court however, 
has had difficult in defining these conceptions and has avoided the issue 
altogether.  The first and quite obvious definition of necessity is the 
“reproduction” conception. 
In this conception, a BFOQ necessity is one that would change the 
business in the smallest way possible.  In this definition of BFOQ necessity 
everything that a business does is necessary.  Effectively, we have to ask if 
we restrict the relevant action of the business, will the business be the exact 
same as it was before the restriction (i.e., will it be a reproduction of the 
original business)?  The answer will always be no.  Anything that a 
business changes will effectively change the business in some way (even if 
very small).  Although a trivial way to perceive necessity, it defines one 
end of the spectrum (i.e., the most respectful of the business self 
determination). 
The second conception is the “indifference” consideration.  This 
conception argues that a necessity is one that keeps a business operating, 
i.e., if we were to restrict the activity at issue, the business would be 
indifferent from operating in the first place.176  This consideration is at the 
other end of the spectrum from the reproduction consideration.  Here, 
generally any activity will be protected if it is the case that restricting it will 
cause the company to go out of business.  Take, for example, the case of a 
female clothing company not being able to discriminate against male 
models.  If the government were to require Ann Taylor to use male models 
it would likely frustrate the company’s business model so much that it 
 
 174. Manley, supra note 160, at 175–76. 
 175. Id.; see also Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (holding that 
discrimination of women based upon the simple fact that they were fertile is not enough to prevent 
women from working with lead). 
 176. See generally ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY (4th ed. 1995) 
(Discussing the economics of indifference in markets.  The theory holds that in a perfectly competitive 
market, all firms make zero profits and hence all are always indifferent among staying in the market, 
entering the market and leaving the market.). 
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would seize to be a business or would become a new business altogether.  
This level of deference is very low. 
The third, “competitive advantage,” consideration of necessity lies in 
between the reproduction and the indifference considerations.  The 
competitive advantage consideration will allow certain discriminatory tasks 
that maintain a company’s competitive advantage.  This necessarily lies in 
between the two polar considerations.  A competitive advantage is an 
advantage that allows a company to make monopoly like rents in a very 
competitive industry.  It does this through having valuable inputs and 
resources that are difficult for other companies to imitate.177 
A court would likely hold that only the indifference consideration is 
relevant in deciding whether a task is necessary for a business.  Courts have 
previously held that discrimination that creates sustained profits is not a 
rationale for arguing BFOQ and hence a competitive advantage is probably 
not a sufficient necessity.178  The competitive advantage is difficult to both 
argue for and against because on the one hand, Title VII holds 
discrimination as a national issue that is predicated on irrational views of 
people who are in some way different from others; and, on the other hand, 
our deference and fundamental protection of entrepreneurship and profit 
inducing behavior is highly valued.179 
As I argue below, treating for-profit companies as expressive 
associations makes the determination of a BFOQ necessity more difficult 
and likely pushes us further towards the reproduction consideration and 
away from the indifference condition ultimately settling somewhere that 
necessarily considers competitive advantages to be relevant to employment 
discrimination. 
 
B.  THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION DEFENSE 
 
Treating for-profit companies as expressive associations will expand 
the defenses against Title VII discriminations.  It would expand the BFOQ 
defense by shifting the BFOQ necessity consideration from an indifference 
one to a competitive advantage one.  The argument there would be that a 
company’s expressive association right and the resultant speech are integral 
to the operations of a business.180  This right in the BFOQ context would 
 
 177. For an extensive discussion of competitive advantage, see Jay Barney, Firm Resources and 
Sustained Competitive Advantage, J. MGMT., March 1991, at 99. 
 178. See, e.g., Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 179. See Mark S. Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 318 (1987), for an extensive discussion of competitive advantage and Title VII. 
 180. For Hobby Lobby, religion was integral to the workings of the business.  Religious practices 
permeated through its mission, charter and even actions.  In this way, one could argue that Hobby 
Lobby’s exercise of religion is part of its necessity so as to move the dial from an indifferent 
  
Winter 2016 FULLY AND BARELY CLOTHED 169 
add another dimension to the indifference consideration thereby effectively 
moving the level of protection to something more akin to a competitive 
advantage consideration.  One could view this defense simply as an 
expansion of the definition of the indifference consideration (i.e., more 
things are now considered to contribute to the indifference decision of the 
company) or as an expansion of the definition of necessity as a whole by 
providing protection to things that create competitive advantages. 
A theoretical defense would have to proceed as follows: A company 
would first have to argue that employment decisions are analogous to 
membership inclusion decisions.  As the cases above show, discrimination 
on membership grounds is protected if it is associated with speech of an 
expressive association.  Providing employment to people in order to be part 
of a company is very similar to providing membership to an organization.  
In fact, we already protect a religious company’s right to discriminate 
against nonreligious employees in part due to the freedom of association 
jurisprudence.  This was the exact issue at hand in Amos.  The Court there 
held that some jobs were appropriately reserved for Mormons because the 
speech of the Church necessitated discrimination based upon religion.181 
Once shown that employment decisions are like membership 
decisions, a company then needs to argue that they have certain speech that 
they promulgate which is connected to their employment decision.  A 
company could argue that gender, sexual orientation, or religious 
discrimination matter because the company has a speech agenda that hinges 
upon showing that one gender or one religion is more important or 
better.182  Remember that even if this speech is perverse to our general 
notions of tolerance and inclusion, it is protected under the freedom of 
association doctrine.  In fact, the whole purpose of an expressive 
association is to protect public dissenting speech.183  A company would 
effectively argue that in addition to profit maximizing behavior, it also has 
a speech component to its business plan.  This speech is protected (in light 
of Citizens United and Hobby Lobby) and hence the company should be 
treated in the same way as the Boy Scouts and Jaycees. 
Lastly, the company would have to show that its speech is frustrated 
by imposing specific hiring (inclusion) decisions.  As I will describe below, 
if the speech is sufficiently connected to the hiring decision, it stands to 
reason that restricting the employment decision will in turn frustrate and 
restrict the company’s speech.  The company would argue that as a matter 
 
consideration to a competitive advantage one. 
 181. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 338. 
 182. See below for an argument that discrimination against men is justified because it furthers 
speech that women are better served to be sexual objects for male desire. 
 183. See Bedi, supra note 50, at 431, 438–39. 
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of protecting its expression it should be allowed to continue its 
discriminatory practices, and that to outlaw its practices would infringe on 
its associative right to exclude.184 
This defense might seem awkward at first glance because we have 
generally not thought of for-profit corporations as expressive associations.  
However, it is not that hard to envision a case where given the Court’s 
recent jurisprudence, it would have to treat corporations like expressive 
associations.  Once this happens, for profit companies become very similar 
to organizations like the Boy Scouts, the Jaycees, and the Mormon Church.  
It is hard then to rationalize treating the exclusion decisions of a corporate 
expressive association differently than the exclusion decisions related to 
non-profit membership organizations. 
The next section uses the above theoretical framework to show and 
argue how two companies (Hooters and Abercrombie & Fitch) could 
successfully argue an expressive association defense to Title VII 
regulations. 
 
V.  HOOTERS AND ABERCROMBIE & FITCH 
 
A.  CASE STUDY 1: A DEFENSE OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION (HOOTERS) 
 
Hooters is a very well-known restaurant that serves various types of 
American food (buffalo wings, burgers, and salads) and alcohol.  The 
restaurant is staffed by a very unique set of servers who also wear a very 
unique uniform.  Hooters currently only hires women as waitresses.  It also 
makes its waitresses wear very short shorts and tight halter tops geared to 
sexually extenuate the bodies of its waitresses.  Hooters came under 
scrutiny from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 
starting in the late 1990s.185  Since the 1990s, Hooters has been sued and 
challenged on its employment practices by women and men alike.186  Three 
men sued Hooters in 1997 for denying them employment as waiters.  
Hooters settled this case outside of court and agreed to make some jobs in 
the restaurant available to men.187  These included mainly jobs associated 
with bartending.  In 2009, another man sued Hooters claiming that they 
 
 184. Requiring expressive associations to comply with nondiscriminatory hiring and inclusion is 
effectively a type of government regulation that frustrates speech. 
 185. See Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, Redressing for Success: The Liability of Hooters Restaurant for 
Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 168 (1997), for a detailed discussion of 
the sexuality implications of Hooters treatment of its employees. 
 186. See Kenneth L. Schneyer, Hooting: Public and Popular Discourse About Sex Discrimination, 
31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 551 (1998), for an extensive discussion of the lawsuits. 
187.  Hooters Settles Suit by Men Denied Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1997/10/01/us/hooters-settles-suit-by-men-denied-jobs.html. 
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denied him the job of a waiter because of his sex;188 again, Hooters settled.  
In 2010, Hooters was sued for threating to fire a waitress because her body 
type did not fit the Hooters ideal waitress.189  This lawsuit was filed in 
Michigan, which is one of the only states that outlaws discrimination based 
upon weight and height.190  Hooters settled this case outside court.  There is 
a pattern here.  Hooters has done everything in its power so as to not 
litigate a case with the EEOC.  Presumably this is because it suspects that 
its practices of only hiring women to be waitresses (it calls its waitresses 
“Hooters Girls”)191 is likely a violation of Title VII.192 
The problem for Hooters is likely two-fold.  The first is simply that it 
discriminates against men (a Title VII issue).  Hooters might be able to 
argue the traditional BFOQ defense.  Based upon the jurisprudence of 
gender discrimination, though, a court would likely not favorably find in 
favor of Hooters.  The analysis would simply be that the “essence of 
business” test fails.  The essence of Hooters is not to sell sex or entice men, 
rather, its essence is to serve food.  As such, men do not do a better or 
worse job of selling food to customers and therefore Hooters must comply 
with Title VII.193 
The second problem for Hooters is that it clearly sexualizes women by 
implying that they need to have a certain body type and wear certain 
revealing clothes in order to be a Hooters Girl.194  Hooters has come under 
public scrutiny for this mentality.  People have argued that Hooters should 
not sexualize women and instead should respect the various body types and 
attitude that women and men have to sexuality.  This is commonly referred 
to as the sexual harassment problem that Hooters faces.195  The interesting 
thing here is that this “problem” could actually be the winning argument 
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Hooters is looking for.  By arguing that Hooters is promulgating sexually 
related speech it could garnish protection as an expressive association. 
Gender discrimination and the BFOQ has been widely written on.  In 
particular, discrimination that puts women in “sexually denigrating 
situations, especially highlighting the resulting subordination of 
women.”196  Gender discrimination cases of this sort generally fall into 
three categories that closely resemble the three considerations of the 
necessity described in Part III above.  The seminal example that allows 
gender discrimination and the subsequent sexual treatment of women in a 
very limited sense is a gentlemen’s club.  For these companies, it is widely 
accepted that the exclusive employment of women is a necessity.  After all, 
it is the essence of the business to sell sex.  And, in order to do so, a club 
must be allowed to hire only women.  This mentality has carried over to the 
company Playboy.197  In these cases, the governing bodies held that the 
exclusive hiring of women as Playboy bunnies was amenable to a BFOQ 
defense.  The adjudicators generally find that the Playboy’s “central 
mission is to sell sexual entertainment.”198  Furthermore, some have argued 
that hiring men to be Playboy bunnies would frustrate the purpose of the 
business because men “lack the feminine sex appeal which is central to the 
mission of the Playboy Club.”199 
These cases fall into the “indifference consideration.” If the 
government were to require gentlemen’s clubs and the Playboy Club to hire 
men in the same way they hire women, the companies would likely refrain 
from being in business in the first place.200  They would effectively be 
indifferent between closing shop and staying in business while having to 
comply with Title VII regulations. 
At the other end of the spectrum, there are cases that refuse to extend 
the BFOQ defense to the “reproduction consideration.”  In Wilson v. 
Southwest Airlines, the Texas court refused to allow gender discrimination 
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because it found that the discrimination did not affect the central premise of 
the business.201  In Wilson, Southwest Airlines exclusively hired female 
employees in order to increase its sales.202  It argued that female flight 
attendants and greeters were better for business because across the board, 
people liked them more.  It also claimed that hiring women furthered the 
intent of its then “love image” marketing campaign.203  This campaign had 
“images and advertisements that were permeated by sex.”204  The 
commercials had voice-overs like “in-flight love” while showing attractive 
women helping male passengers into their seats.205  It had themed food and 
drink items (“love bites” and “love-potions”) and even machinery (“quickie 
machine” title for the ticketing machine).206 
Even though Southwest made its case clear, the Texas court found that 
its practices did not qualify as a BFOQ defense.  The court articulated that 
a BFOQ defense is only valid when ““vicarious sex entertainment is the 
primary service provided and female sexuality [is] reasonably necessary to 
perform the dominate purpose of the job which is forthrightly to titillate 
and entice male customers.”207  Similarly to Diaz, the court in Wilson found 
that the primary business purpose of Southwest was to safely transport 
people from one point to another.  It was not to sell sex in the same way a 
gentlemen’s club does. 
The court has emphasized that customer based discrimination can 
never be a defense to Title VII regulations.208  Customer based 
discrimination takes the form of choosing employees simply based upon 
that fact that customers prefer women to men, or whites to minorities, or 
Christians to Muslims.  The argument here is a simple profit one.  By 
hiring employees that customers like better, a company can increase profits 
(Southwest’s main argument in trying to exclusively hire women).209  The 
court has clearly struck this mentality down, because “it would be totally 
anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices of the 
customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was valid.  Indeed, 
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The EEOC guidelines which help implement Title VII regulation also 
make clear that customer based employment discrimination will not hold 
up against Title VII: “the refusal to hire an individual because of the 
preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers will not merit 
a BFOQ exception.”211 
Customer based employment discrimination along the lines of 
Southwest Airlines fall into the “reproduction consideration” test of the 
essence of the business.  Southwest and the like effectively argue that by 
not allowing them to exclusively hire women, their profits are lowered and 
as such they are not the exact same business as they were before.  That, by 
having men in the same roles, they will not be able to reproduce the initial 
discriminating business. 
The two ends of the spectrum are quite clear and generally easy 
undertakings.  But the “competitive advantage” considerations in this 
context are more difficult to apply because the general purpose of the 
business and the selling of sex appeal are so closely intertwined that 
disaggregating the two is often hard to do.  Hooters is the prime example of 
a company that falls into the “competitive advantage” category.  Hooters 
does not sell sex in the same way that a gentlemen’s club does, but it also is 
not so removed from sex appeal as is Southwest Airlines.  In fact, selling 
sex in combination with selling food is integral to the Hooters business 
model.212  As such, it is a difficult task to determine whether or not Hooters 
would get the BFOQ defense.213  This might be exactly why Hooters has 
not allowed any of its EEOC Title VII lawsuits to go to a verdict. Patricia 
Casey (the then-attorney of Hooters) wrote in a response to the EEOC: 
 
The business of Hooters is predominantly the provision of 
entertainment, diversion, and amusement based on the sex 
appeal of the “Hooters Girls.”  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
specifies that a company can discriminate among job 
applicants based on Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications 
(BFOQ).  The Playboy Club won repeated court victories in 
the 1970s and 1980s when sued over its female-only Bunny 
policy.  But throughout the EEOC’s investigation of 
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Whether or not Hooters gets a BFOQ is a very fact specific inquiry 
and different courts might come out differently.  However, Hooters might 
have another outlet available to argue that it should be allowed to continue 
gender discrimination and maybe even have a defense to the sexual 
discrimination implicit in its uniforms and treatment of Hooters Girls. 
Hooters could potentially argue that it is an expressive association 
under the Citizens United and Hobby Lobby precedents.  As such, its 
speech should be protected under the freedom of association jurisprudence 
giving it a right to exclude those whose inclusion would frustrate its 
speech.  A possible framing of the argument would follow like this: 
Although Hooters is a for-profit company that operates a restaurant, it 
is much more than that.  It is an association that promulgates a certain 
speech.  It furthers this speech by its marketing materials, its employees 
and its attitude towards doing business.  The restaurant is supposed to 
resemble a beach environment, with décor including “bare wooden floors 
and walls with bar stools.”215  The Hooters Girls also exemplify a beach 
atmosphere as they are skimpily clad female servers intended to reproduce 
attractive women in bathing suits at the beach.216  The Hooters Girls are 
encouraged to be friendly with customers and always have a smile.  
Hooters also gears its marketing campaign to promote its unique 
competitive advantage in the restaurant market: the Hooters Girls. 
According to the chain’s marketing information, the servers are supposed 
to give the impression of “cheerleaders” or the “girl next door.”217  In 1986, 
Hooters put out its first yearly calendar where it features several Hooters 
girls in not only their work outfits, but in bathing suits.218  The website 
boasts that “the girls in our calendar aren’t models from New York.  You 
can actually meet every girl in person at a Hooters Restaurant around the 
world.  It’s hard to believe, but EVERY girl in the calendar must be a 
Hooters waitress, she may actually be the girl next door to you.”219  The 
company’s name itself also fits in with the general theme of business. 
“Hooters” is a pejorative slang term for a women’s breasts.  It uses an owl 
for its logo accentuating the “oo’s” in its name. 
Hooters employee handbook reveals many of their intentions in hiring 
and promoting the Hooters Girl image.  It reads in part: 
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The essence of Hooters is the Hooters Girls. Because it is 
essential to our success that the Hooters Girl image is always 
properly maintained, failure to comply with these Image and 
Grooming Standards may result in discipline . . . .  
Customers can go to many places for wings and beer, but it 
is our Hooters Girls who make our concept unique. Hooters 
offers its customers the look of the “All American 
Cheerleader, Surfer, Girl Next Door.”220 
 
The handbook shows that Hooters not only recognizes its competitive 
advantage, but that it takes the initiative to communicate this to its 
employees.  The “Hooters Concept” is the “entertainment through female 
sex appeal, of which the LOOK is a key part.”221  The handbook goes on to 
prescribe correct methods of applying makeup, using hair accessories, 
jewelry, not showing tattoos, and of course several pages of detailed 
analysis on the metrics of the Hooters Girls uniform.  Every part of the 
restaurant’s operation is geared towards promoting the image of the 
Hooters Girl.  And it has a very specific idea of what a Hooters Girl must 
be as evidenced by the detailed employee standards on physical 
appearance. 
In Dale, the Court found that although the Boy Scouts did not 
promulgate speech per se, the activities, the policies and the operation of 
the business were effectively speech that advocated against gays as being 
“morally straight” and “clean.”222  In the same way, Hooters, although not 
promulgating speech per se, has instituted activities, policies and operations 
that can be viewed as speech advocating for the girl-next-door vision of 
beauty.  But more than that, the business as a whole can be seen as 
promulgating speech that entails that these girls next door are the staple of 
American society and their purpose is to is to “sexually attract and titillate 
heterosexual males.”223  Speech can come in many forms, it just happens to 
be that Hooters’s speech comes in the form of antiquated misogyny.224  It is 
advocating a type of speech that maybe in the twenty-first century we find 
to be perverse and dissident.  But Hooters would argue that this is the exact 
type of speech that the freedom of association exists to protect.  The 
freedom of association protects public dissent and speech that is genuinely 
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counter to the majority and is offered into the public sphere.225  Its speech is 
one that is public (advertisements, calendars, websites, etc.) and dissenting 
(misogyny).  Why then is it wrong for it to ask for protection under the 
freedom of association? 
If we take the holdings in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby to be that 
for-profit corporations can have protected speech in addition to for-profit 
motives, we open the door to allowing corporations to view themselves as 
expressive associations.  They then can claim the freedom of association 
right to exclude members (in this case potential employees).  Hooters might 
be able to take advantage of these short-sighted holdings and argue that its 
speech advocating misogyny must be protected. 
If we grant Hooters this speech, the next step of the analysis is to ask 
whether or not requiring the company (association) to comply with 
employee hiring (membership inclusion) requirements would frustrate its 
message.  It is pretty clear that if the Boy Scout’s speech would be 
frustrated by gays, the Hooters’s speech would be frustrated by requiring 
the company to hire men.  In fact, a Hooters Girl would cease to exist if it 
were not a girl in the first place.  Moreover, requiring Hooters to get rid of 
its detailed and overbearing employee handbook would also frustrate the 
message of women as being sexually attractive so as to generally titillate 
heterosexual males. 
But some would argue that in order for an association to have speech, 
the speech must be agreed upon by all the people who are members of the 
association (shareholders in a for-profit corporation).226  This would 
effectively prevent Hooters from being an expressive association.  But is 
this criticism realistic in the Hooters case example?  Maybe not.  First of 
all, Hooters is a private company and owned by Chanticleer Holdings, 
LLC.  There is only shareholder in this case.  One could easily argue that 
by buying the company in the first instance after performing the due 
diligence routinely employed by such a transaction, Chanticleer Holdings, 
LLC has effectively ratified the misogynist speech of Hooters.227  
Moreover, even if Hooters were owned by several shareholders, it stands to 
reason that the public perception of Hooters along with its marketing 
materials and calendars make clear to potential investors that Hooters is 
promulgating speech.  By its own accord, Hooters recognizes that its 
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competitive advantage is the Hooters Girls, i.e., its high profits are directly 
tied to the concept and execution of the Hooters Girls.  When investing in a 
company or buying its shares, shareholders are expecting to receive a profit 
or return.  When a company’s speech (e.g., Hooters’s misogynist speech) is 
so directly tied to profits, it would be awkward if an investor wanted to 
own the company and gain profits from it, but did not also share the 
importance of the Hooters Girls.  As such, with speech (however perverse) 
that is so closely tied to profits, it can be argued that owning shares of a 
company is an implicit ratification of the company’s speech. 228 
 
B.  CASE STUDY 2: A DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION 
(ABERCROMBIE & FITCH) 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States recently ruled on a case in 
which Abercrombie & Fitch was accused of not accommodating a young 
Muslim girl’s religious practice of wearing a hijab.229  The lower court of 
appeals ruled in favor of Abercrombie because it held that the company did 
not have “actual knowledge” of the women’s religion under a strict reading 
of Title VII.230  The Supreme Court overturned the lower court opinion, 
holding that a plaintiff need only “show that his need for an 
accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.”231  
Effectively, the Court ruled that actual knowledge is not the right standard.  
Instead, if it is shown that an employee’s religion played any role in the 
employer’s decision, then the case for intentional discrimination has been 
made. 
Ms. Elauf (a young practicing Muslim women) interviewed for a 
sales-floor position at Abercrombie and Fitch.232  During this interview she 
wore the traditional garb for a practicing Muslim women, the hijab.  The 
interviewer rated Ms. Elauf on a scale of three points for various set 
categories.  According to the company, Ms. Elauf initially received a two in 
each category for a combination of six, “which is a score that ‘meets 
 
 228. See William A. Sodeman, Social Investing: The Role of Corporate Social Performance in 
Investment Decisions, BUS. & SOC’Y, Aug. 1994, at 222–23; Thomas C. Berry & Joan C. Junkus, 
Socially Responsible Investing: An Investor Perspective, 112 J. BUS. & ETHICS, Feb. 2013, at 707; and 
Ivan Barreda-Tarrazona et al., Measuring Investors’ Socially Responsible Preferences in Mutual Funds, 
10 J. BUSI. & ETHICS, Oct. 2011, at 305 for the connection between investing in a company and 
responsibility for the company’s actions. 
 229. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). 
 230. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 731 F.3d 1106, 1116 (10th Cir. 2013) (noting that the 
Title VII statute reads in part that it is unlawful for an employer . . . to “discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s . . . religion” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1))). 
 231. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 135 S. Ct. at 2032. 
 232. Id. at 2031. 
  
Winter 2016 FULLY AND BARELY CLOTHED 179 
expectations’ and amounts to a ‘recommen[dation]’ that Abercrombie hire 
her.233  Since Ms. Elauf wore a head-scarf to the interview, the interviewer 
(not sure as to whether the head scarf was necessary for Ms. Elauf) decided 
to lower the “appearance & sense of style” score to a one.  This brought 
Ms. Elauf’s score down to a five, a score that does not receive a 
recommendation for hiring. 
The wearing of the hijab is at odds with Abercrombie’s “Look 
Policy.”  Abercrombie requires its employees to comply with this policy, 
which is “intended to promote and showcase the Abercrombie brand, which 
‘exemplifies a classic East Coast collegiate style of clothing.’”234  This 
policy is taken very seriously at Abercrombie, so much so that in the policy 
it refers to the sales-floor employees as “Model[s].”235  Most important for 
the case at hand is the policy’s prohibition on any “black clothing and 
caps.”236  If an employee does not adhere to this prohibition or the “Look 
Policy” as a whole, she is subject to “disciplinary action . . . up to and 
including termination.”237 
Abercrombie vehemently claimed that its “Look Policy” is integral to 
the success of the company and “is critical to the health and vitality of its 
preppy and casual brand.”238  So much so that the company claims that the 
main job of a “Model” is to represent and promote the Abercrombie 
clothing and brand.239  It is easy to see that the black hijab that Ms. Elauf 
wore to her interview was at odds with Abercrombie’s strict clothing 
policy.  However, Title VII requires employers to “reasonably 
accommodate an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious 
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the 
employer’s business.”240  Abercrombie even has a similar policy and 
indicates that human resources managers “may grant accommodations if 
doing so would not harm the brand.”241  The circuit court interpreted Title 
VII to only impose this obligation if and when the employer had actual 
knowledge that the employee needed an accommodation pursuant to the 
religion they practice.242  The Tenth Circuit held that on a close reading of 
the statute, although Abercrombie might have suspected that Ms. Elauf was 
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Muslim, it did not have actual knowledge (Ms. Elauf did not indicate to 
them that she needed an accommodation).  As such, Abercrombie did not 
violate Title VII by refusing to hire Ms. Elauf because of her hijab. 
The Supreme Court, however, read Title VII differently.  It held that 
actual knowledge was not required.  Instead, it held that an “employer may 
not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor 
in employment decisions.”243  Since Abercrombie did consider the fact that 
Ms. Elauf had a scarf in their decision, they used her religion as a factor 
and therefore violated Title VII. 
However, the posture of this case raises interesting issues on what 
would happen if Abercrombie attempted to argue an expressive association 
exemption to Title VII regulation even if it had knowledge of Ms. Elauf’s 
religion and need of accommodation. 
Abercrombie might argue that it is an expressive association and its 
Look Policy is a type of protected speech.  As such, their speech would be 
frustrated by having to provide accommodation to Ms. Elauf wearing her 
hijab.  Although Abercrombie could be seen as an expressive association, 
like Hooters, I argue that the “Look Policy” would not be treated as 
protected First Amendment speech in the same way the Hooter’s employee 
handbook could be.  In which case, Abercrombie could not use the 
expressive association defense to successfully defeat this Title VII lawsuit. 
From the discussion above, it can be credibly argued that 
Abercrombie & Fitch is an expressive association.  Although, it seeks to 
make profit, it too, as the Court has made clear, could also associate so as 
to take part in any First Amendment activity.  An integral part of the 
freedom of association jurisprudence is the right to exclude based upon the 
specific speech that is promulgated.  Abercrombie would have to argue that 
its speech is its “Look Policy.”  That is to say, that it wishes to exclude 
those people who do not abide by its “Look Policy” because it will frustrate 
its speech. But what exactly is the speech in this case? 
It seems that the company would argue that the “Look Policy” 
represents what it views as being “beautiful” or “good looking” in today’s 
world.  That not wearing hats, dressing as an East Coast prep and being a 
“Model” is what its brand is attempting to promote (in effect, that 
following the “Look Policy” means you are cool or hip).244  If we concede 
that this is the nature of the protected speech, it is pretty clear that a 
Muslim women wearing a hijab would be at odds with the speech and 
would frustrate it.  As a matter of fact, any headgear would probably 
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frustrate the speech (a Sikh man wearing a turban or a Jewish man wearing 
a yarmulke).  In this way, if a court were to protect the exclusion of 
Muslims, Jews or Sikhs, then it would treating the “Look Policy” as 
protected speech under the freedom of association jurisprudence. 
I argue, however, that this is not a strong case for expressive 
association protection.245  In effect, the “Look Policy” speech is not strong 
enough speech and does not “create space for democratic dissent — space 
that serves as a genuine counter to the majority’s decision.”246  The “Look 
Policy” speech is of very low value, if it is even speech at all.  Hence, this 
speech would not be protected even if Abercrombie was deemed to be an 
expressive association.  The nature of the exclusion gives us great insight 
into what exactly the speech is and who it attempts to exclude. 
The speech, facially, is not antireligious, pro-gender, pro-race or even 
pro-body type.  It is simply speech that defines what a good look is.247  In 
this way, the speech is not discriminatory on its face.  The “Look Policy” 
speech does not say that Abercrombie will not hire people who are Muslim 
or Sikh or Jewish, rather it says, they will not hire people who wear hats or 
headgears.  It just happens to be that very strict practicing Muslims, Sikhs, 
or Jews would be excluded from employment, because they tend to wear 
clothing on their head.  Justice Thomas’s dissent although not suggesting 
that the “Look Policy” is speech, does draw upon this argument.  He argues 
that the Abercrombie “Look Policy” is a “neutral Look Policy . . . it does 
not treat religious practices less favorably than similar secular practices, but 
instead remain[s] neutral with regard to religious practices.”248  Ironically 
for Justice Thomas, because the policy is neutral, it garnished more 
protection in the case. Under the expressive association defense, a policy 
that is actually more targeted would garnish more protection. 
This is not like the discrimination that we encountered above in the 
Hooters case. That discrimination was very specifically anti-male.  It was 
an exclusion of a whole category of protected potential employees.  There 
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the employer, Hooters, was advocating a personal discriminatory 
viewpoint.  The discrimination in the Abercrombie case is more akin to 
disparate impact discrimination, i.e., one that is results based not intent 
based. 
Abercrombie does not seem to dislike Muslims or Sikhs as a prima 
facie category of people.  Rather, their speech seems to create results that 
disparately impact and shut out those people who happen to be Muslim or 
Sikh.  In this way, it is less problematic than the discrimination in Hooters.  
It can be generally agreed upon that it would be worse for Abercrombie to 
outright say in the “Look Policy” that they do not want to hire Muslims, 
Jews or Sikhs because Abercrombie does not like them.249 
Ironically, the fact that Abercrombie’s discriminatory intent does not 
outright denounce a religion makes it less likely that a court would protect 
its speech.  Speech implicated in disparate impact discrimination will 
generally not arise to the level of dissenting speech as speech implicated in 
intent based discrimination.  In order to be protected First Amendment 
speech, associative speech must contribute to some democratic debate.  
Speech that says hats are not cool does not seem to arise to the level of 
speech that claims women are inferior to men, gays are inferior to straights, 
or Muslims are inferior to Christians.  It is the speech that is problematic in 
our eyes that deserves protection in the eyes of the Court.250 
So, Abercrombie could argue that it is an expressive association. It, 
however, would not receive the same deference on that speech that Hooters 
would get, because the Abercrombie speech would only have a disparate 
impact on Muslims, Sikhs, or Jews, while Hooters’s speech would have, 
and does have, a direct impact on all males.  Abercrombie’s practices of 
discrimination based upon its “Look Policy” should not concern us when 
viewing companies as expressive associations.  It would not be able to use 
the freedom of association jurisprudence to hide behind its employment 
discrimination decisions. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
This article has argued that treating for-profit corporations as 
expressive associations, regardless of structure or number of shareholders, 
can create perverse outcomes for employment discrimination.  In particular, 
treating corporations like expressive associations, as the recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence might implicate, could potentially allow employers to 
use First Amendment protected speech to hide behind egregious 
employment discrimination decisions. 
The freedom of association jurisprudence was created to protect a very 
specific type of entity, an association geared towards advocacy.  The 
gradual movement away from this limited protection particularly with Dale 
combined with the expansive view of a corporation’s role in the public 
discourse, risks expanding the right to exclude to for-profit corporations. In 
order to not overrule Citizens United or Hobby Lobby, a difficult task of 
limiting which kinds of companies can advocate speech through the 
corporate form will have to ensue.  Included in this discussion will have to 
be whether large companies with differing shareholder viewpoints should 
be treated differently than closely held companies with shareholder unity in 
speech. 
One safeguard to corporate discrimination could be the marketplace of 
ideas theory that Justice Holmes famously articulated.  That, as long as we 
protect high value speech regardless of content, the public will decide 
through its own consumer based restrictions which speech it values and 
which speech it dislikes.  If we are currently operating under this theory, 
then it is probably the case that Hooters’s speech is liked in the 
marketplace, as people still patron their restaurants frequently. 
At the end of the day, however, we have to be skeptical of any for-
profit company and nonadvocacy organization (whatever its size or agenda) 
arguing an expressive association defense to Title VII restrictions.  At the 
same time, courts will have to weigh our robust history of protecting the 
First Amendment and the open dissemination of dissenting speech with the 
corporate ability to discriminate.  A task, I argue, will be increasingly more 
difficult in the wake of Dale, Citizens United, and Hobby Lobby. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
